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ABSTRACT  
   
 This dissertation assesses the impact of revenue diversification on state revenue 
growth and volatility and then, the economic, political and institutional factors that 
predict diversification. Previous studies, taking advice from modern portfolio theory, 
argue that diversifying a revenue portfolio can stabilize volatility and even lead to faster 
rates of growth over time. However, levels of diversification are not assigned 
exogenously. Rather, differences among states in diversification might be a consequence 
of differences in states such as electoral cycles and the presence and strictness of tax 
limitations. Thus, the research question is: Whether or to what extent has diversification 
increased revenue growth and decreased volatility when the endogeneity of 
diversification is considered?  
 Using two-stage least squares and fixed-effects regression models with the data of 
the 50 states from 1980 to 2011, I examined the impact of diversification, reflecting a 
state's own political and institutional characteristics (i.e., endogeneity), on growth and 
volatility.  
 I found diversification was positively related to growth, but a diversified portfolio 
does not smooth volatility. Furthermore, I found that the level of revenue diversification 
increased in each year of legislators' terms and decreased in every year of governors' 
terms. These findings imply that legislators and governors have different preferences for 
diversification, perhaps due to different opportunities to enhance their reelection 
prospects.  
 I then investigated the relationship between political leaders' year of the terms and 
changes in specific revenue sources, the biggest set of reelection opportunities. Selective 
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sales and income taxes were negatively related to every year of legislators' terms. General 
sales taxes, corporate income taxes, and charges are positively related to every year of 
governors' terms. The results suggest that legislators focus on their districts or specific 
interest groups, closely associated with selective sales taxes. In contrast, governors' 
constituency-driven preferences lead them to be responsible for broader issues such as 
balancing the state budget, thereby using general sales taxes and charges as methods to 
do so. As a consequence of these political factors, levels of diversification will change, 
thereby influencing revenue growth and volatility. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 State government leaders want to structure revenues to grow in a predictable and 
stable manner over years, especially in the upcoming fiscal year. However, the leaders 
have not been able to realize this goal because the levels of revenues are sensitive to 
economic changes. Revenue structure diversification has been viewed as a means to 
smooth volatility and even lead to faster rates of revenue growth over business cycles. 
According to previous studies, a state's fiscal volatility will decrease and its growth rate 
will increase if the state relies on a diversified revenue structure (Carroll, 2005; Schunk 
& Porca, 2005). In diversified and balanced portfolios composed of elastic and less 
elastic revenue sources, less elastic revenue sources will compensate for the decrease of 
elastic revenue sources caused by recessions. 
 My dissertation casts doubt on officials' unlimited choices in diversifying 
revenues. Levels of revenue diversification are not assigned randomly or exogenously; 
rather, states choose their own levels of revenue diversification within the limits they face. 
My study assumes that differences among states in revenue diversification might be a 
consequence of differences in states, such as electoral cycles and the presence and 
strictness of tax and revenue limitations. This dissertation reexamines the impact of 
revenue diversification on state revenue growth and volatility.  
 My dissertation is divided into seven chapters, including this introduction. The 
second chapter explores the practical and theoretical questions related to the function of 
revenue diversification on revenue growth and volatility. 
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 The third chapter begins with a review of the literature related to the four general 
principles of sound revenue policy—namely, ease of administration/compliance, 
economic efficiency, fairness, and adequacy—in order to examine the meaning of 
revenue diversification from a broad perspective. I then look deeply into revenue 
adequacy in terms of revenue growth and volatility. After reviewing the definition and 
measures of revenue diversification, I explore how revenue diversification plays a role in 
increasing revenue growth while decreasing volatility. Finally, the section explores the 
potential endogeneity of revenue diversification based on past research. 
 The fourth chapter discusses what we know and do not know about relationships 
among revenue diversification, revenue growth and volatility, and other explanatory 
variables, based on previous literature, and provides several hypotheses related to the 
areas that are lacking in terms of revenue diversification in the public budgeting and 
finance area. 
 The fifth chapter covers the methodology, discussing the research design, data 
sources, variables, and empirical models. My dissertation uses a panel data set of 50 U.S. 
state data from 1980 to 2011, gathered mainly from the Census Bureau, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and Council of State Governments. This chapter also discusses the 
measures of dependent and independent variables and specifies empirical models. The 
dependent variables considered are revenue growth and volatility; the main independent 
variable is revenue diversification. 
 The sixth chapter reports the statistical findings while the seventh chapter 
summarizes the findings and discusses implications of the findings, limitations, 
contributions, and future research directions.  
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Chapter 2 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS 
 This chapter elaborates upon the theoretical and practical research questions and 
problems. My dissertation begins with the question of whether a diversified revenue 
portfolio increases state revenue growth and smoothes volatility. This question is 
important to both researchers and practitioners as it will broaden the theoretical 
discussion on the function of revenue diversification and help practitioners make 
informed decisions about adjusting revenue portfolio in response to economic changes. 
 In contrast to existing literature, the second big question in my study is whether 
the effect of revenue diversification on revenue growth and volatility depends on the 
differences in three state conditions: electoral cycles, the strictness of tax and revenue 
limits, and economic conditions. Specific research problems are related to this second 
significant question are. 
 First, levels of revenue structure diversification would be affected by a state's 
electoral cycles. If state political leaders decrease the rates of particular visible revenue 
sources and narrow bases of the revenue sources before and during an election year in 
order to enhance their reelection prospects, the levels of revenue diversification will 
change, thereby affecting revenue growth and volatility. 
 Second, the strictness of tax and revenue limits would affect revenue structure 
diversification. States that require stricter legislative items, such as super-majorities or 
popular referenda, to enact tax increases are more likely to prompt legislatures to 
consider alternative revenue sources, such as charges and fees for services. The levels of 
revenue diversification will change, thereby influencing revenue growth and volatility. 
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 Third, economic changes prompt governors and legislators to manage their 
revenue portfolios in order to compensate for revenue shortfalls during recessions and 
moderate the accumulations of surplus during expansions. States would adjust their 
revenue rates and bases to lessen the impact of economic changes and, in turn, levels of 
revenue diversification will change, thereby influencing revenue growth and volatility. 
 In sum, the level of revenue diversification reflecting the three identified 
conditions could lead to changes in states' revenue growth and volatility levels. By 
assuming the potential endogeneity of revenue diversification, my dissertation 
investigates how and to what extent a state's revenue diversification, estimated by these 
three conditions, affects revenue growth and volatility over time. It then examines 
specifically how and to what extent political leaders' electoral cycles, the presence and 
strictness of tax and revenue limits, and economic changes affect levels of revenue 
diversification. The 50-state panel data for the period from 1980 to 2011 are used in my 
study.  
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Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 To review the existing literature, this chapter begins with four general principles 
of sound revenue policies—namely, ease of administration/compliance, economic 
efficiency, fairness and adequacy. It then goes into detail regarding revenue adequacy in 
terms of revenue growth and volatility. This chapter also explores the effect of revenue 
diversification on revenue growth and volatility along with the definition and measures of 
revenue diversification. Finally, it investigates the economic, institutional, and political 
determinants of revenue diversification. 
Principles of Sound Revenue Policies 
 Most of the revenue that state governments collect is derived from such sources as 
taxes in addition to charges and fees for services. Such revenues are based on personal 
income as well as the sales of services, and property. The collected revenues fund public 
services or programs. Revenue policy determines “how the collective cost of government 
services will be distributed among [individuals]” (Mikesell, 2007, p. 291).   
 Given the vague nature of the term sound, a “sound” revenue policy is not easy to 
define. To some people, a sound revenue policy depends on who bears the revenue 
burdens. Others evaluate the policy in terms of the revenue policy’s impact on economic 
growth. Many researchers and observers have tried to set standards for sound revenue 
systems by taking multiple principles into account. Adam Smith was the first to provide 
guidelines for revenue collection in a market-based economy. He proposed the following 
four basic maxims in his prominent book, The Wealth of Nations (1776): 
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 I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
 government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that 
 is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection 
 of state. 
 II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not 
 arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, 
 ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. 
 III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time or in the manner, in which it is most 
 likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. 
 IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the 
 pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the 
 public treasury of the state. (Smith, 1776, pp. 777-779) 
The principles implied in these maxims remain important issues today.  
 Researchers and practitioners have repeated these principles for many years, 
although their terminology has changed over time (Blough, 1955; Break & Pechman, 
1975; Brunori, 1997, 1998, 2011; Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy [ITEP], 
2011; Mikesell, 2007; Reese, 1980; Shoup, 1937).  
 As such, several commonly cited principles of sound revenue policy have 
emerged. Some scholars have identified four broad principles: adequacy, fairness, 
collectability/simplicity, and economic efficiency (Mikesell, 2007). Brunori’s (1997, 
1998) early studies also suggested four principles: adequacy, fairness, ease of 
administration/compliance, and accountability; his most recent study (2011) added 
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neutrality to the list. Other scholars have delineated five principles: fairness, adequacy, 
simplicity, exportability, and neutrality (ITEP, 2011).  
 My dissertation uses four broad principles: ease of administration/compliance, 
economic efficiency, fairness, and adequacy. I chose several common criteria from 
previous studies, including fairness and adequacy; meanwhile, criteria such as 
accountability and exportability are not discussed here. In addition, I selected an easier 
criterion to understand (i.e., ease of administration/compliance) and a flexible criterion 
considering reality (i.e., economic efficiency) from criteria with similar meaning.  
 The principles of ease of administration/compliance and simplicity pursue the 
similar purpose of minimizing compliance costs for revenue payers and collection costs 
for governments. However, since the phrase, ease of administration/compliance, is 
immediately easier to understand than simplicity, my dissertation uses ease of 
administration/compliance as a criterion.  
 Meanwhile, the criterion of economic efficiency (Mikesell, 2007) is a more 
flexible criterion than neutrality (Brunri, 2011; ITEP, 2011). According to the objective 
of economic efficiency, revenue payers should bear the revenue burden to the extent that 
necessary revenues are raised while economic distortion (the excess burden) must be 
maintained as low as possible (Mikesell, 2007). Based on the neutrality objective, 
business decisions should be dictated not by the tax code, but by market conditions and 
the cost/benefit rule (Brunori, 2011). In reality, it is not possible to ensure economic 
decisions without any economic distortion. Thus, economic efficiency is a more 
reasonable criterion considering reality.  
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 The following subsections provide a more detailed explanation of these four 
principles.  
 Ease of administration and compliance. Revenues must be collected easily. 
Collection and compliance costs do not provide any net benefit to society (Mikesell, 
2007). An easy and simple revenue system should avoid “complex provisions and 
regulations; multiple filing and reporting requirements; and numerous deductions, 
exclusions, and exemptions” (Brunori, 1997, p. 53). Complicated revenue systems 
confuse citizens, and governments face difficulties in monitoring and enforcing revenue 
collections. Moreover, some groups can take advantage of a revenue system full of 
loopholes. For example, lawmakers use inherent complexity in revenue policy to enact or 
conceal targeted breaks that benefit particular groups (ITEP, 2011). Therefore, a revenue 
system must be designed to keep total collection and compliance costs as low as possible.  
 Economic efficiency. The revenue principle of economic efficiency indicates that 
undesirable excess burdens should be minimized. It is highly possible that tax codes 
affect individual or business decisions related to their investments or purchases more than 
their preferences do. In other words, revenue collection by its very nature creates a 
burden on payers.  
 However, according to the principle of economic efficiency, governments should 
minimize excess revenue burdens on revenue payers. Excess burdens or deadweight 
losses refer to the amount of social benefit sacrificed due to the presence of revenue 
collection. For example, if revenues are levied on income from labor, the increase in the 
revenues leads some people to work fewer hours and increase their leisure hours (i.e., 
substitution effect), whereas other people work more to cover the amount of revenues 
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(i.e., income effect). The sum of the substitution effect and income effect represents the 
revenue payer's behavior in responding to increases in revenues while their reduced 
utility becomes the deadweight loss. 
 Excess burden or undesirable distortions result in “a waste of productive 
resources, lower rates of economic growth, and lower national living standards” 
(Mikesell, 2007, p. 317). Therefore, the revenue policy seeks to generate the necessary 
revenue (i.e., the revenue burden), while keeping economic distortion (i.e., the excess 
burden) as low as possible (Mikesell, 2007).  
 Fairness. The revenue burden should be distributed fairly. When people discuss 
revenue “equity,” they are talking about fairness. Yet, the true meaning of fairness is 
elusive, as individuals perceive fairness differently. What is an unfair revenue system to 
one person might seem quite fair to others (Brunori, 1998; Gruber, 2005; Young, 1994). 
Evaluating a revenue system’s fairness requires examining both particular concepts of 
equity and a means to measure the system’s distribution (Gruber, 2005; Musgrave, 1959). 
The most commonly cited approaches to fundamental revenue fairness are: (a) the benefit 
principle, (b) the ability-to-pay principle, and (c) the revenue incidence analysis. 
 The first approach, the benefit principle, means that the cost of the benefit 
received from the government should be distributed to revenue payers according to the 
extent of benefit received. Fairness in the context of the benefit principle relates the 
revenue payers’ exchange of public services with governments (Gerbing, 1988). 
Measuring the principle requires knowing how much the benefits are and who receives 
those benefits from the government. However, these populations are very difficult to 
identify. Moreover, it is doubtful that the benefit principle can properly or actually 
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mitigate inequality. Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave (1980) commented 
that “the benefit approach, ideally, will allocate that part of the tax bill which defrays the 
cost of public services, but it cannot handle taxes needed to finance transfer payments 
and serve redistributional objectives” (p. 238). 
 The second approach to fairness in revenue collection, the ability-to-pay principle, 
means that the cost of government should be distributed according to a taxpayer’s ability 
to pay. Those with a greater ability must pay more than those with a lesser ability do. The 
ability-to-pay principle is connected to the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity. 
Revenue payers with an equal or similar ability should pay the same amount of revenues, 
while those with a different ability should pay a different amount of revenues. 
 More specifically, the principle of horizontal equity lies in treating equals equally. 
In other words, individuals with similar resources, including income, wealth, or profits, 
should be treated in the same way by the revenue system regardless of the different 
economic or lifestyle choices they make. If one person pays much higher revenues than 
another person with similar circumstances, it violates the concept of horizontal equity. 
Yet it is difficult to define “similar or identical circumstances” in order to measure 
horizontal equity or inequity in the real world (Gruber, 2005). From a practical standpoint, 
determining whether revenue payers have similar circumstances depends on the 
conditions of income, family structures, and age (ITEP, 2011). Nevertheless, because it is 
ambiguous to examine horizontal equity except in extreme cases, the issue is 
continuously raised in debates and is “often distorted to fit the views of the proponents or 
opponents of a particular [revenue] proposal” (Gruber, 2005, p. 496). 
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 The principle of vertical equity refers to the idea that people with more resources, 
including higher income, greater wealth, or higher profits, should pay higher revenues. 
However, no scientific guideline exists to determine how much revenue people with 
different resources should pay (Mikesell, 2007). Rather, vertical equity is evaluated by 
“how a [revenue] affects different families from the bottom of the income spectrum to the 
top from poor to rich” (ITEP, 2011, p. 1). Three standard measures are used to measure 
vertical equity: regressive, proportional, and progressive revenue structures.  
 A revenue structure is regressive if low- and middle-income families pay a higher 
share of their income in revenues than do upper-income families. A revenue structure is 
proportional if all families pay the same share of income. A revenue system is 
progressive if upper-income families pay a higher share of their incomes than low- and 
middle-income families. 
 Vertical equity generally defends the progressive revenue system; those with 
higher income must pay a higher rate of revenue because of their own greater ability to 
pay (Gerbing, 1988). Given the definition that effective average revenue rates are the 
ratio of personal revenue payments to total income, “effective average rates must rise 
[faster] with income, so that the rich pay a higher share of their income in [revenues] than 
do the poor” (Gruber, 2005, p. 496). 
 However, because most states have revenue portfolios with regressive, 
proportional, and progressive revenues, it is difficult to distinguish the 
regressivity/progressivity/proportionality of their structure in a simple way. When viewed 
from a portfolio perspective, the progressivity in one revenue can offset the regressivity 
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in another revenue to some degree. Therefore, the overall level of progressivity or 
regressivity of a revenue system might be evaluated by: 
 (1) The degree of progressivity or regressivity of each revenue within the system 
 and, 
 (2) How heavily a state relies on each revenue within the system. Thus, a state 
 that relies on regressive sales, excise and property taxes more heavily than a 
 progressive income tax will end up with a very regressive revenue system overall. 
 (ITEP, 2011, p. 1) 
 Adequacy. Adequacy is defined as how well a government can collect enough 
revenues to sustain the level of public services its citizens and policy makers demand 
(Blom & Guajardo, 2001; ITEP, 2011). It is important to collect sufficient revenues to 
fund public services in the upcoming fiscal year as well as over the long term. Thus, it is 
desirable for revenues to change at the same or a very similar rate as the state 
expenditures. Several researchers concur that adequacy is the primary goal of revenue 
policies (Ladd, 1988; Reschovsky, 1998), because it serves as a criterion for 
distinguishing a successful revenue system from an unsuccessful system (ITEP, 2011). 
 However, the concept of adequacy sounds complex in that the accounting 
discussion is different from the economic discussion (Laffer, 2004). Although revenue 
increases at a higher revenue rate from the accounting concept, economic discussion 
recognizes the negative impact of a higher revenue rate on work, output, and employment. 
Indeed, when facing higher revenue rates, revenue payers are likely to change their 
behavior to avoid higher payments. The increasing revenue rate can become an excess 
burden on revenue payers beyond the revenue burden. Revenues will increase to a given 
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level of revenue rate, but they might actually shrink beyond the particular revenue rate as 
revenue payers change their behavior (Laffer, 2004). 
 In addition to changes in the revenue rate, the elasticity of a particular revenue 
source to economic fluctuation is a main factor of adequacy (ITEP, 2011; Mikesell, 2007). 
Elasticity refers to the change in the yield of a particular revenue source given economic 
growth. In general, some revenue sources (e.g., taxes on corporate profits) are more 
sensitive to change in economic activity and conditions than others, including property 
taxes. John Mikesell (2007) noted, “A revenue source with good cyclical adequacy 
remains reasonably stable during periods of declining economic activity” (p. 312). Thus, 
when a government’s revenue system cannot adapt to changing economic conditions, 
large deficits or surpluses emerge (Blom & Guajardo, 2001). The National Conference 
State Legislature (NCSL) (1999) recommended that a government use a diversified 
revenue portfolio.1 Revenue resources relatively inelastic to changing economic 
conditions can offset the lost portion by relying on sources that are quite elastic to 
economic fluctuations. 
 Summary and implication of sound revenue policy. The four criteria of a sound 
revenue policy have been discussed in the first section of this chapter. Ease of 
administration/compliance focuses on providing a simple and easy revenue system to 
improve revenue payers' and revenue collectors' understanding. Economic efficiency 
requires governments to minimize the excess revenue burden on revenue payers. Fairness 
involves governments imposing more revenue on those with a greater ability to pay 
                                                 
1
  Retrieved from NCSL: http://www.ncsl.org/magazine/sl-mag-the-history-of-us.aspx 
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whereas adequacy requires governments to collect sufficient revenues to maintain public 
services.  
 However, these criteria—namely, ease of administration/compliance, economic 
efficiency, fairness, and adequacy—might not be simultaneously achieved in reality 
because of the conflict among them. For example, economists have highlighted the 
economic efficiency criterion while paying less attention to other criteria, such as 
fairness. Others see growth competing with distribution. The priority among criteria 
might depend on the situations in which governments are placed. 
 Particularly in fiscal crises, most governments tend to pay more attention to 
revenue adequacy (Lowery, 1984; Reschovsky, 1998). The protracted downturn 
decreases a revenue growth rate while uncertainty in the economic condition increases 
volatility in the revenue collection. An adequate revenue system makes it possible to 
collect sufficient tax revenues to provide public services to the public.  
 The next section examines the ways in which to attain an adequate revenue 
system in terms of revenue growth and volatility in detail. 
Revenue Adequacy: Growth and volatility 
 Revenue adequacy is widely accepted as an important revenue policy principle 
(Brunori, 1997, 1998; ITEP, 2011; Zodrow, 1998). One version of the principles defines 
adequacy as “whether the [revenue] system raises enough money, in the short run and the 
long run, to finance public services” (ITEP, 2011, p. 5). A government should raise 
sufficient funds to maintain the level of public services demanded by citizens (ITEP, 
2011). In the short term, state governments must ensure that they have enough money to 
sustain public services in the upcoming fiscal year. In addition, governments should 
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balance their budgets not only in the immediate future, but also over the next five to ten 
years (ITEP, 2011) to fund public programs. 
 Adequacy should have some requirements. For example, most previous studies 
point out that the revenue system should ensure stability and growth (Bruce et al., 2006; 
Dye & McGuire, 1991; Groves & Kahn, 1952; Mallick & Harmon, 1994; Sobel & 
Holcombe, 1996; White, 1983). Stability requires revenues to be relatively constant over 
time. Stable revenues are not likely to fluctuate unpredictably with changes in the 
economy. Many studies use instability, variability, and volatility instead of stability. In 
general, the term volatility, or stability, refers to the potential variability in state revenues 
from the expected level of revenues at various points over the years (White, 1983). In 
addition, growth means generating enough revenue yields to maintain public spending 
over the years. 
 Many researchers begin by arguing that revenue growth should match spending 
growth. However, in their research, discussions, and conclusions, the balance between 
revenues and public spending is not the main point; rather, they seem to focus on growth 
responding to economic growth. Some studies have pointed out that, at best, a particular 
revenue can account for a considerable part of total revenues, thereby satisfying the 
sufficiency criterion. For example, Zodrow’s (1998) definition of growth is limited to 
economic growth, as follows: 
 [R]evenues should grow at approximately the same rate as the state economy, so 
 that periodic rate increases are unnecessary. Note, however, that such growth 
 implies that revenues would increase at a rate equal to the sum of the inflation rate 
 and the real rate of growth in the economy (p. 15).  
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 Any examination and assessment of revenue growth needs to consider the growth 
side of both public spending and economic growth. However, many studies have not 
analyzed the balance aspect between revenue growth and spending growth. They neglect 
might be due to the fact that the amount of state spending has remained relatively stable 
over time.  
 However, state governments have been asked to manage and pay for various 
public services, including welfare, and Medicaid. Thus, recent health care cost inflation 
affects state spending growth (Fox, 2004). In addition, education spending such as K—12 
spending must grow faster than economic inflation in order to maintain or improve the 
current quality of education (Fox, 2004). Therefore, revenue growth should be discussed 
in future research in order to take into account new decisions on public spending along 
with the increased or decreased costs of existing public services due to economic 
inflation (Fox, 2004). My dissertation does not deal with the expenditure side, because it 
focuses on the revenue side and the issue of sufficiency is beyond my research.   
 Previous studies of adequacy have assumed that the cost of public programs 
grows at the same rate as economic change without considering explicit changes in 
decisions related to public programs. More discussion on this is warranted in another 
research. The current dissertation follows this same assumption and defines growth as the 
long-term trend of a state's revenues over years (White, 1983).2  
                                                 
2
  Relevant studies have not precisely defined the period of “long-term.” Rather, a "long-
term" period seems to equal a research period. For example, Bruan and Otsuka (1998) used 11 
years of the research period from 1981 to 1991, and Carroll (2005) used 11 years from 1990 to 
2000. In addition, White (1983) used data from the period from 1970 to 1981. Previous studies 
have not specifically defined the terminology of “long-term,”; rather, they have applied different 
periods of “long-term” to their studies.   
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 Returning to the issue of revenue adequacy, the next section examines the 
measures of revenue growth and volatility as well as the relationship between them based 
on previous studies. 
 Measures of growth and volatility. Several studies, including Mallick and 
Harmon (1994) and White (1983), examined growth and volatility in terms of a revenue 
portfolio rather than individual revenue sources. The portfolio approach makes it easy to 
assess overall growth and volatility. Thus, growth is represented by the long-run or 
trending rate of growth in a state's revenue structure, which includes several taxes as well 
as charges and fees over time. Meanwhile, volatility is measured by variability from the 
growth trend line in the short term (Mallick & Harmon, 1994; Misiolek & Perdue, 1987; 
White, 1983; Yan, 2008). 
 Other studies have used long-term and short-term income elasticity to represent 
revenue growth and volatility, respectively (Bruce et al., 2006; Fox & Campbell, 1984; 
Holcombe & Sobel, 1997). The two measures—trend rate of growth and income 
elasticity—generate different information and answer different questions (Dye & 
McGuire, 1991). Income elasticity measures the relationship between revenues and 
economic activity whereas the trend rate of growth simply measures revenue growth over 
time (Dye & McGuire, 1991). The trend rate measure has an advantage in exploring 
revenue growth and volatility over years from both economic and non-economic (i.e., 
political) perspectives. 
 Relationship between growth and volatility. Previous studies have identified a 
positive relationship between growth and volatility (Braun & Otsuka, 1998; White, 
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1983). As the overall growth rate of a revenue portfolio increases, revenue volatility also 
increases (Braun & Otsuka, 1998; White, 1983).  
 However, the relationship between growth and volatility is not always positive. 
For example, in their research, Mallick and Harmon (1994) demonstrated that growth 
does not have a clear positive relationship with volatility through tax portfolio analysis 
used in New York State in FY 1987—1988 (see Table 1). As the results in Table 1 
indicate, although revenue structures B and C have the same growth rate, 7.7, revenue 
structures B and C have different degrees of volatility, 5.83 and 14.57, respectively. 
Thus, we do not know whether there is a positive or no relationship between revenue 
structure growth and volatility. 
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Table 1  
 
Various Frontier Portfolios for New York State in FY 1987-1988―The Revenue Portfolio 
Growth-Volatility Frontier (mix of tax shares providing greatest stability for any 
particular revenue growth rate) 
 
Revenue Sources Portfolios on the Efficient Frontier 
 A B C D E F 
Personal Income 
Tax 
33 40 50 45 47 44 
Sales Tax 37 34 23 32 23 5 
Transport Tax 15 8 3 3 0 0 
Sin Tax 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Energy Tax 12 15 5 17 22 34 
Corporate Tax 0 0 10 0 0 0 
Transfer Tax 3 3 6 4 8 18 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
Portfolio Growth 
Rate 
7.0 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.0 
Portfolio Volatility 0.90 5.83 14.57 10.90 19.35 42.09 
 
Note: The following taxes are included in each group: Except personal income and sales 
taxes, others are described. (1) transport―highway use, motor fuel, and motor vehicles; 
(b) sin―alcohol-beverage, alcohol-beverage license, cigarette, and pari-mutuel; (c) 
energy―public utility and petroleum business; (d) corporate―bank, corporate franchise, 
and insurance; and (e) transfer―estate and gift, real estate gains, and real estate transfer 
(p. 436). Adapted from "Portfolio Analysis and Vertical Equity: a New York 
Application," by R. Mallick and O. R. Harmon, 1994, Public Finance Review, 22, p. 430. 
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 Relationship among growth, volatility, and economic changes. Economic 
changes affect revenue structure growth and volatility. States usually face revenue 
changes over every business cycle. Almost every state experiences a drop in revenues 
during a recession and an increase after the recession (Sobel & Wagner, 2003). A state 
revenue portfolio, which is composed of elastic and less elastic sources, is affected by 
economic changes; accordingly, collected revenues fluctuate over business cycles (Braun 
& Otsuka, 1998; Holcombe & Sobel, 1997; Sobel & Wagner, 2003; Wilford, 1965). 
Furthermore, when a fiscal crisis emerges, the level of total revenues drops and the 
growth rate of total revenues also decrease as long as the crisis continues.  
 Summary and implications of revenue adequacy. Revenue adequacy refers to 
having sufficient revenues to maintain public services and programs as demanded by the 
public. Revenue should grow by at least the same rate as public expenditures in the long 
run. Revenue adequacy has been academically discussed in terms of short-run volatility 
and long-run growth. In my dissertation, growth is the long-term trend of a state's 
revenues over years; volatility refers to the potential variability in state revenues from the 
expected level of revenues at various points over the years (White, 1983). In order to 
raise revenues, the states should consider both long-term growth and short-term volatility. 
 When it comes to the relationship between volatility and growth, Mallick and 
Harmon's (1994) study provided the results of an inconsistent relationship between two 
concepts using revenue portfolio analysis even though they used only one case from New 
York state. In addition, economic changes affect states' revenue growth and volatility.  
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Revenue Diversification for Stable, Growing Revenues 
 This section investigates the positive effect of revenue diversification on state 
revenue growth and volatility. Revenue diversification has been considered a guarantor 
for stable, growing revenues at the state level. This section discusses the modern portfolio 
theory on which the discussion of revenue diversification has been based; it first 
examines the definition and measures of revenue diversification and then the impact of 
revenue diversification on growth and volatility.  
 The modern portfolio theory of revenue diversification. Meaningful 
diversification requires a state to avoid relying on any particular revenue source at the 
cost of other revenue sources (Carroll, 2005; Carroll et al., 2003; Cline & Shannon, 1983; 
Suyderhoud, 1994). A diversified revenue portfolio includes taxes and other types of 
revenues such as user charges and fees (Carroll et al., 2003).  
 Although the concept of revenue diversification in public portfolios seems 
straightforward, its origin is in the private sector that deals with investments. The modern 
portfolio theory (MPT) was introduced by Harry Markowitz in a 1952 Journal of Finance 
article entitled "Portfolio selection." Portfolios are referred to as the groups of objects of 
choice (Francis & Kim, 2013). According to Markowitz (1952), a well-diversified 
investment portfolio is likely to yield an overall, higher expected return and lower 
variance (risk or uncertainty) in the market. In other words, a diversified portfolio yields 
the same expected return with less risk compared to a portfolio that is not diversified.  
 MPT assumes that an investor does (or should) maximize the potential returns 
(benefits) and minimize risk (uncertainty) in an efficient market (Markowitz, 1952). 
Investors are assumed to be rational. Here, rationality means being satisfied with 
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constructing a less risky portfolio as long as the expected return is the same. As a 
normative theory, MPT assumes that investors are supposed to be coherent and consistent 
in their investment choices unless they are willing to increase risk without financial 
compensation (McCue, 2000). Furthermore, investors are expected to adjust quickly to 
any changes affecting the market or a return on investment (McCue, 2000).  
 MPT remains meaningful in the public budgeting and finance field both 
theoretically and practically. The management of risk and return in revenue collection 
might increase the capacity of political leaders to gather and manage revenues effectively 
(McCue, 2000). Diversifying revenue sources can be an effective and efficient strategy. 
Some researchers in the field have argued that diversification might encourage a 
broadening of the revenue base, generating less volatility and more flexibility in financial 
management (Bartle et al., 2003; Yan 2008). The reduction of volatility, according to 
modern portfolio theorists, is achieved by developing multiple revenue sources that are 
not perfectly correlated (Francis & Kim, 2013; Markowitz, 1952). 
 Measures of revenue diversification. The measurement of revenue 
diversification is complex. Until Suyderhoud (1994) used the modified Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index in the 1990s, a state was treated as having revenue diversification if a 
share of the major revenue sources fell into a specific range of ratios (Cline & Shannon, 
1983; Ladd & Weist, 1987; Shannon, 1987). 
 Early prescriptions (i.e., 1960—1975) urged that the individual income tax, the 
general sales tax, and the local property tax should each contribute 20 to 25 percent of all 
state-local tax revenues (Suyderhoud, 1994). In the early 1980s, this threshold was 
modified somewhat as researchers recognized the importance of user fees and severance 
  23 
taxes. However, a balanced tax system still required the personal income tax to account 
for 20 to 35 percent of all state―local tax revenues while the general sales and local 
property taxes accounted for 20 to 30 percent each (Suyderhoud, 1994). Shannon (1987) 
defined a tax system as being “strongly balanced” if each of the big three (property, 
general sales, personal income) taxes accounted for 25 to 43 percent of the sum of these 
revenues; meanwhile, a tax system is “fairly well balanced” if each of the big three 
contributed 20 to 48 percent of the sum of these revenues. 
 However, Suyderhoud (1994) criticized these previous criteria of diversification 
for ignoring the role of other resources, such as corporate income taxes, user charges, and 
selective sales taxes. Suyderhood used four rather than three categories: property taxes, 
personal and corporate income taxes, general sales taxes, and all other revenues, 
including non-tax revenues. In addition, Suyderhoud (1994) developed a quantifiable 
measure of diversification, based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) (Herfindahl, 
1950; Hirschman, 1945). The measure indicates “the extent to which a revenue structure 
is diversified relative to a theoretical maximum” (Suyderhoud, 1994, p. 173).3   
 As Suyderhoud (1994) noted, his revised HHI diversification index offers several 
advantages over the previous approach. First, HHI is a well-established and well-
accepted measure developed in the industrial organization concentration research to 
measure industry diversification that reduces risk (Suyderoud, 1994; Yan, 2008). Second, 
it is a continuous measure rather than a categorical measure, and it measures the relative 
position of a revenue structure to its maximal diversification. 
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   “A diversification index of 1.00 indicates maximum balance among revenue categories, 
whereas an index value of 0 indicates total reliance on only one category” (Suyderhoud, 1994, p. 
173).  
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 Effect of revenue diversification on revenue growth and volatility. The topic 
of revenue diversification became important for state governments especially in the 
1960s and 1970s, in response to the fiscal crises and tax revolts they experienced 
(Carroll, 2005). In particular, the main target of tax revolts has been to impose restraints 
on the local governments' authority to increase the local property tax. However, the 
restraints have also limited the size of revenue increases in state governments (Carroll, 
2005). Fiscal crises and these limitations have urged state governments to find creative 
ways to maintain or increase revenues, and the issue of revenue structure diversification 
has attracted states' attention (Carroll, 2005). 
 A state with a well-diversified revenue portfolio can smooth volatility and protect 
growth rates from sharp decreases during recessions (Braun & Otsuka, 1998;Carroll, 
2005). Carroll (2005) indicated that the 25 most diversified states experienced an average 
decline in tax revenue of only 2.7 percent, while the 25 least diversified states went 
through an average decline of 4.8 percent in the fiscal crisis between 2001 and 2002. 
Determinants of Revenue Diversification 
 Previous relevant studies have identified determinants of revenue diversification. 
Revenue diversification levels could reflect such institutional conditions as the presence 
of tax and revenue limits as well as economic conditions, and these conditions could lead 
to changes in state revenue growth or volatility levels.  
 This section discusses the relationships between economic conditions and revenue 
diversification, and between an institutional factor (i.e., the presence of tax and revenue 
limits) and revenue diversification. The section further explores the possible association 
between another institutional factor (i.e., legislative super majorities or popular referenda 
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on tax increases) and revenue diversification. Neither of these has been discussed in 
previous literature on diversification. The discussion of the possibilities is based on 
previous research on the connection between strict tax and revenue limitations and 
heavier reliance on charges and fees for services not restrained by limitations. In addition, 
the section investigates the potential relationship between electoral cycles as political 
factors and revenue diversification, which also has not been directly investigated in 
previous research. The discussion of possibilities is based on prior work that examined 
the association between electoral cycles and the change of revenue source rates and bases.  
 Economic factors. Economic changes influence a state's flexibility to diversify its 
revenue sources. For example, severe fiscal crises might force state leaders to change 
their revenue portfolio. On the revenue side, a state in recession tends to rely more on 
relatively inelastic revenue sources than on elastic revenue sources to lessen the impact of 
recession (Clemens & Miran, 2012; Matsusaka, 2005). The adjustment of the state's 
portfolio influences levels of diversification (Carroll, 2005).  
 Institutional condition 1:Tax and revenue limits. Tax and revenue limitations 
influence a state's ability to diversify its revenue sources. Carroll (2005) found a negative 
relationship between revenue diversification and the imposition of tax and revenue 
limitations for revenue policy changes in states. Thus, her research suggested that tax and 
revenue limitations restrain political leaders' ability to increase levels of diversification. 
 Institutional Condition 2: Strict tax and revenue limits. The effect of strict tax 
and revenue limits on revenue diversification has not been directly discussed. However, 
strict restrictions on taxing might also influence political leaders' ability to increase levels 
of diversification in a different manner.  
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 For instance, Mullins and Joyce (1996) indicated that tax and revenue limitations 
result in attempts to increase alternative sources of revenues, not usually constrained by 
the limitation, particularly in terms of user charges and fees for services. Thus, most state 
governments tend to increase a proportion of charges and fees for services to total 
revenues when states need to increase revenues (Mullins & Joyce, 1996; NCSL, 1999). 
 Moreover, arguing without data, NCSL (1999) wrote that states requiring 
legislative super-majorities or popular referenda to enact tax increases are more likely to 
consider charge and fee increases than states not requiring them when states need to 
increase revenues. Therefore, it is plausible that stricter tax and revenue limitations would 
lead states to increased charges and fees for services. Levels of revenue diversification 
will increase as a result.   
 However, due to the lack of empirical studies, we do not know whether the 
strictness of tax and revenue limitations influence (or vary with) levels of revenue 
diversification. 
 Political conditions. Given the incentives for reelection, what and when can 
political leaders do anything about revenue diversification? Despite what public 
budgeting and finance researchers argue, the politics of the diversification decision makes 
it unclear whether political leaders will act efficiently on the resource side of budgeting. 
Although previous studies have not directly analyzed the relationship between elections 
and levels of revenue diversification, there are some reasons to suspect the link between 
them. First, revenue policies are critical political issues in states. Previous studies have 
argued that a state's governor and legislature have incentives to adjust revenue policies 
during electoral cycles (Blais & Naneau, 1992; Rogoff, 1990).  
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 Public choice theory helps understand why political leaders would or would not 
choose to diversify their states' revenue portfolios. Public choice assumes that rational 
individuals, including elected political leaders, act out of their own self-interest. The 
assumption of self-interest means that individuals have their own preferences that 
influence the decisions they make (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971). According to public choice 
theory, as decision makers, political leaders seek advantages within the strategic 
opportunities they find. Only incidentally will leaders be evaluated by whether decision 
outcomes are consistent with efficiency standards (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971). Leaders are 
assumed to choose maximizing strategies under uncertainty, which will provide the 
highest net personal benefit as weighted by their own preferences (Ostrom & Ostrom, 
1971).  
 Political leaders, including legislators and governors, have few incentives to 
deviate from their constituents' interest (Bender & Lott, 1996). Because reelection, and 
not efficiency, has the highest payoff for them, leaders make decisions that benefit their 
constituents (Bender & Lott, 1996; Tollison, 1988).  
 Does revenue portfolio diversification—efficiency—benefit leaders and their 
constituents? As a matter of fact, we do not know. Reducing volatility in revenue 
collection is viewed as one of the important criteria for evaluating financial performance 
(ITEP, 2011). Stable collected revenues make stable funding for services and programs 
that benefit constituents more likely. Thus, rational political leaders would seem likely to 
select a diversified revenue portfolio, according to MPT principles.  
 However, political leaders might not select a diversified revenue portfolio. For 
example, rebalancing a portfolio can require a rate increase in a particular revenue base 
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that negatively affects constituents' interests. Thus, legislators' self-interest might not lead 
them to choose a diversified revenue portfolio.  
 Second, a limited number of empirical studies have supported the electoral cycle 
theory for a revenue policy at the state level (Mikesell, 1978; Nelson, 2000). Mikesell 
(1978) and Nelson (2000) identified changes in tax rates and new tax adoptions for state 
governments over electoral cycles. According to Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000), tax 
rate increases and adoptions distinctively occurred in the first year of a governor's and 
legislator's terms for a state with a 4-year election cycle for a governor and a 2-year 
election cycle for the legislature (see Table 2 and Table 3).4 5 In election years for both 
the governor and legislature, tax rate increases and adoptions were rarely implemented 
according to Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) (see Table 2 and Table 3).  
                                                 
4
  Mikesell (1978) included individual income, corporate income, cigarette, gasoline, and 
distilled spirits taxes and treated them as broad-based taxes in his analysis. In contrast to broad-
based taxes, the selective excise taxes—gasoline, distilled spirits, and cigarette taxes—did not 
show a pattern significantly different from the general revenue policy of tax increases and new 
source adoptions (Mikesell, 1978).  
 
5
  According to Mikesell (1978), tax increases and adoption are substantially less likely to 
occur in an election year than in the first year of a governor's term. In addition, considering 
legislators who are in either an election year or the year before an election year, the probability of 
tax adoption or rate increase in each of the years might be ordered: first year of a governor's term 
> third year of a governor's term > second year of a governor's term > gubernatorial election year 
(Mikesell, 1978). 
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Table 2  
 
Comparison of the Results regarding State Tax Increases and Adoptions by Year of 
Gubernatorial Election Cycle between Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) 
 Mikesell (1978), 1960-1977  Nelson (2000), 1946-1986,  
1990-1993 
Tax Years Before Next 
Election for Governor 
Number 
of 
Increase/ 
Adoption 
 Years Before Next 
Election for Governor 
Number 
of 
Increase 
/Adoption 
3 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 
Personal 
Income 
 
27 
(%) 
24 41 8 37  52 
(%)  
11 29 9 91 
Corporate 
Income 
 
34 19 40 7 90  45 10 33 12 118 
Sales  
 
47 16 30 8 64  40 16 29 15 120 
Gasoline 
 
47 13 38 2 53  39 12 39 10 197 
Cigarettes 
 
61 11 29 0 38  41 13 38 8 152 
Distilled 
Spirits 
 
55 13 30 2 47       
Alcohol       45 14 32 9 203 
 
Note: Percentage of rate increases by tax. Adapted from "Election Periods and State Tax 
Policy Cycles," by J. L. Mikesell, 1978, Public Choice, 33(3), p. 102-103 and "Electoral 
Cycles and the Politics of State Tax Policy," by M. A. Nelson, 2000, Public Finance 
Review, 28(6), p. 545. 
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Table 3  
 
Comparison of the Results regarding State Tax Adoptions by Year of Gubernatorial 
Election Cycle between Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000)  
 Mikesell (1978), 1960-1977  Nelson (2000), 1946-1986, 1990-
1993 
Tax Years Before Next 
Election for Governor 
Number 
of 
Adoption 
 Years Before Next 
Election for Governor 
Number 
of 
Adoption 3 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 
Individual 
Income 
 
71 
(%) 
 29  7  70 
(%) 
 30  10 
Corporate 
Income 
 
83 17   6  67  33  9 
Sales  
 
63  25 13 8  62  39  13 
Gasoline 
 
           
Cigarettes 
 
25 25 50  4  39 8 39 8 13 
Distilled 
Spirits 
 
           
Alcohol       100    1 
 
Note: Percentage of total adoptions by tax. Adapted from "Election Periods and State Tax 
Policy Cycles," by J. L. Mikesell, 1978, Public Choice, 33(3), p. 102-103 and "Electoral 
Cycles and the Politics of State Tax Policy," by M. A. Nelson, 2000, Public Finance 
Review, 28(6), p. 545. 
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 Furthermore, the number of tax rate decreases from 1960 to 1977 was limited (see 
Table 4). Similarly, Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) found that tax rate decreases in 
states relatively rarely occurred, considering the number of states and the length of time 
period between 1946 and 1993 (see Table 4). Nelson (2000) concluded, “These data 
provide only weak evidence in support of the view that state politicians deliberately 
reduce taxes before election periods” (p. 544).6 
  
                                                 
6
  Mikesell (1978) analyzed the 36 states from 1960 to 1974; Nelson (2000) did not provide 
the specific number of states examined.  However, both studies were restricted to states with a 4-
year election cycle for governor and a 2-year legislature cycle. The study period of Nelson's 
(2000) study began in 1946 and ended in 1993. Because states' tax changes immediately followed 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the years 1987–1989 were excluded in Nelson's (2000).   
 
6
  Nelson (2000) included individual income, corporate income, sales, cigarette, alcohol, 
and motor fuel in the analysis. Alcohol excise tax is a group of taxes composed of beer, wine and 
distilled spirits.  
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Table 4  
 
Comparison of the Results regarding State Tax Decreases by Year of Gubernatorial 
Election Cycle between Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000)  
 Mikesell (1978), 1960-1977  Nelson (2000), 1946-1993 
Tax Years Before Next 
Election for Governor 
Number 
of 
Decrease 
 Years Before Next 
Election for Governor 
Number 
of 
Decrease 3 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 
Individual 
Income 
 
  57 43 7  23 18 32 27 44 
Corporate 
Income 
 
60  40  6  32 18 32 18 22 
Sales  
 
 67 33  3  46  27 27 11 
Gasoline 
 
   100 1  100    2 
Cigarettes 
 
67   33 3  100    4 
Distilled 
Spirits 
 
           
Alcohol       44  2 33 9 
 
Note: Percentage of rate decreases by tax. Adapted from "Election Periods and State Tax 
Policy Cycles," by J. L. Mikesell, 1978, Public Choice, 33(3), p. 103 and "Electoral 
Cycles and the Politics of State Tax Policy," by M. A. Nelson, 2000, Public Finance 
Review, 28(6), p. 544. 
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 Given the finding that the timing of tax rate increases and new adoptions is 
associated with electoral cycles, when political leaders show a pattern of strategically 
using a particular revenue source during electoral cycles, the level of revenue 
diversification decreases and its impact on growth and volatility changes as a result. 
 Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) provided different empirical results regarding 
whether the pattern of tax increases across the election cycle differs among the tax 
categories analyzed. Mikesell's (1978) empirical study demonstrated that tax rate 
increases and adoptions were clearly linked with electoral cycles in cases of individual 
income and corporate income taxes and the sales and use taxes in the cases of distilled 
spirits, cigarettes, and gasoline. However, Nelson (2000) provided a different finding: 
“No discernible differences in the patterns of increases among the various tax categories 
could be detected” (p. 545). 
 Based on Mikesell's (1978) study, the degree of revenue diversification is 
expected to change in the first year of a governor's and/or a legislator's terms. However, 
Nelson's (2000) results found nothing distinctive about specific years. Rather, the results 
demonstrated that all years are likely to have similar changes in a state portfolio. 
 Summary and implication of revenue diversification. This section explored the 
modern portfolio theory and measures of revenue diversification, the positive role as a 
guarantor for stable, growing revenues at a state level, and the determinants of revenue 
diversification. Furthermore, this section examined the relationships among the economic, 
institutional, and political conditions and revenue diversification based on previous 
studies. The specific relationships are detailed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4 
HYPOTHESES 
 This chapter discusses what we do and do not know related to the relationships 
among revenue diversification, revenue growth and volatility, and other explanatory 
variables based on the existing literature. The discussion of what we know summarizes 
the previous studies' findings related to the relationships between state revenue growth 
and revenue diversification as well as between state revenue volatility and revenue 
diversification, the determinants of revenue diversification including the presence of tax 
and revenue limits and economic changes, and the association between electoral cycles 
and changes in revenue policies. The discussion of what we do not know involves the 
inconsistent association between revenue growth and volatility, and the plausible 
determinants of revenue diversification, including strict tax and revenue limits and 
political leaders' electoral cycles. This chapter then presents four hypotheses along with 
the remaining questions related to what we do not know.    
What We Know  
 Despite the limited number of studies, previous research has found that a state's 
revenue diversification increases growth and reduces volatility (Carroll, 2005; Schunk & 
Porca, 2005; Suyderhoud, 1994). 
 Revenue structure growth is referred to as the long-term trend of a state's revenues 
over the years; volatility is referred to as the variability in state revenues from the 
expected level of revenues at various points over the years. The rate of growth generally 
increases during an economic expansion for a given revenue portfolio while the rate 
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declines in a recession. In addition, the rate of revenue volatility for a given revenue 
portfolio within a state increases or decreases in response to economic changes. 
 Tax and revenue limitations and economic changes would affect levels of revenue 
diversification. First, tax and revenue limitations reduce levels of revenue diversification 
by restricting a state's ability and flexibility to rebalance revenue sources. Second, 
economic changes lead state political leaders to adjust revenue rates, bases, and portfolios, 
thereby influencing the state's revenue diversification. 
 Meanwhile, state political leaders adjust revenue policies during electoral cycles. 
The electoral cycle theory demonstrates that state political leaders implement increases in 
tax rates and new revenue adoptions if they are in the first year of their terms. In contrast, 
state political leaders rarely increase tax rates or adopt new revenues in the last year of 
their tenures (Mikesell, 1978; Nelson, 2000). The changes in revenue rates and adoptions 
over electoral cycles are associated with the state's revenue portfolio.   
 In sum, the relevant studies produce the following findings. 
 Finding 1. Revenue diversification increases revenue growth and reduces revenue 
volatility. 
 Finding 2. Economic changes affect a state's revenue portfolio growth and 
volatility. 
 Finding 3. Tax and revenue limitations reduce levels of revenue diversification.  
 Finding 4. Economic changes affect a state's flexibility to diversify its revenue 
sources. 
  Finding 5. State political leaders are most likely to increase tax rates and adopt 
new resources in the first year of their terms
strategies in the last year of their terms.  
 Figure 1 presents a diagram for the relat
revenue diversification, electoral cycles, tax 
and volatility at the state level
Figure 1. A model of relationships among 
revenue growth and volatility, 
Note: A solid line presents the relationship that we
number. 
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What We Do Not Know 
 Several questions remain in the state revenue diversification, growth, and 
volatility research. First, we do not know whether and to what extent political leaders' 
portfolio restructuring during their electoral cycles influences revenue diversification. 
The previous studies explained only one revenue policy adjustment during electoral 
cycles and did not identify the impact of the adjustment on revenue diversification. In 
addition, the previous studies of Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) showed different 
statistical results with respect to whether political leaders prefer to raise revenues with the 
relatively elastic or relatively inelastic taxes in order to raise revenues. Thus, although we 
can infer that a revenue portfolio changes during electoral cycles, we do not know 
specifically whether and how revenue diversification changes during electoral cycles. 
 Second, we do not know whether and to what extent strict legislative super-
majorities or referenda requirements influence levels of revenue diversification. NCSL 
(1999) argued that strict legislative supermajorities or referenda limits might lead state 
governments to increase alternative sources of revenues that are not usually constrained 
by the limits, such as user charges and fees for services, yet it provided no data to support 
this argument. Furthermore, we do not know the exact impact of stricter tax and revenue 
limitations on revenue diversification levels. 
 Third, we do not know how and to what extent levels of revenue diversification 
affect revenue growth and volatility when it is assumed that revenue diversification 
reflects such factors of electoral cycles, strict legislative supermajorities or popular 
referenda on tax increases, and economic changes. Without considering the endogeneity 
of revenue diversification, some previous studies have found that the movement toward a 
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well-diversified revenue structure increases growth and reduces volatility. However, the 
dynamics underlying revenue diversification in states would affect levels of 
diversification and, in turn, generate different results regarding the effect of 
diversification on growth and volatility. Thus, questions still remain. 
 Finally, when it comes to the relationship between revenue growth and volatility, 
other studies have found a positive relationship between revenue growth and volatility. In 
contrast, more recent studies have cast doubt about whether a consistent positive 
relationship always exists between revenue growth and volatility. Thus, we do not know 
whether revenue growth has a consistent relationship with revenue volatility or not. 
Hypotheses 
 Given what we do not know, my dissertation suggests four relevant hypotheses in 
light of what we have not known yet determined: 
 Hypothesis 1. Revenue diversification levels change during electoral cycles. 
 Hypothesis 2. States that require strict super-majorities or popular referenda to 
enact tax increases would generate a different level of revenue diversification compared 
to states that do not require strict conditions. 
 Hypothesis 3. The effect of diversification on revenue portfolio growth and 
volatility changes in the model considering dynamics among electoral cycles, strict super-
majorities or popular referenda, and economic changes in revenue diversification (i.e., 
endogeneity), compared to a model not including the dynamics (i.e., endogeneity). 
 Hypothesis 4. Revenue growth rate has no consistent relationship with revenue 
portfolio volatility. 
 My research aims to explore these four hypotheses empirically.  
  Figure 2 depicts a diagram of
diversification, electoral cycles, tax 
growth and volatility in the states
Figure 2. A model of relationships among 
revenue growth and volatility, 
Note: A solid line presents the relationship that we know. A dotted line presents the 
relationship that we do not know. H.# 
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 the relationships among economic changes
and revenue limitations, and revenue structure 
, based on what we know and what we do not
revenue diversification, tax and revenue 
economic changes, and electoral cycles. 
indicates the hypothesis number. 
  
, revenue 
 know. 
 
limits, 
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Chapter 5 
METHODOLOGY 
 My research looks at the 50 American states as a panel and analyzes these state 
revenue structures from 1980 to 2011. The data were collected primarily from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, Census Bureau, and Council of State Governments.  
 This chapter begins with a description about dependent, independent, and control 
variables, describing the measures of variables. It then explains the panel data set that I 
chose and the research design. Finally, I discuss the endogeneity of revenue 
diversification and the measures of potential instrumental variables, and specify the 
model that my research uses. 
The Variables 
 The empirical analysis begins with the estimation of growth, G, and volatility, 
V, of revenue flow. In my study, the measures of revenue growth and volatility are the 
portfolio growth developed by White (1983) and the portfolio variance measure for 
volatility developed by White (1983) and Misiolek and Perdue (1987). Growth is 
measured using a deterministic trend model. Volatility is referred to as the extent to 
which actual revenue deviates from the predicted revenue―that is, the deterministic 
growth trend line (Yan, 2008). Thus, revenue volatility is measured according to the 
variance from the growth trend line here. The formulas of revenue growth and volatility 
are detailed in the following sections. 
 Dependent variable. The dependent variables are revenue portfolio growth and 
volatility. 
 Revenue growth. Two steps are used to calculate revenue growth.  
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 Step 1: Projected revenue growth for individual revenue source. The expected 
revenue growth for each revenue source can be estimated using the following equation. 
 G   
where β is estimated by the following equation:  
(1)    logR  a  year t  e 
where G is the projected annual growth for the ith revenue source, 
R is the revenue from the ith revenue source in period t,  
year  is the time variable indicating year, and 
 is the regression coefficient. 
 My research uses an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model, 
together with diagnostic tests for stationarity and white nose. The annual growth rate 
represents coefficient b in Equation 1, multiplied by 100 to convert it to a percentage (%) 
(White, 1983). 
 Step 2: Projected revenue growth for a revenue portfolio. The overall growth for 
a particular revenue portfolio is measured by a weighted average of growth rates for each 
individual revenue source (White, 1983). This formula is expressed as follows (White, 
1983, p. 106): 
(2)    G  ∑  R 
where G is the estimated annual growth rate for the total revenue portfolio, 
G is the estimated annual growth rate for the ith revenue source,  
R is total revenue (total general fund state-own source revenues) from all revenue 
sources, and 
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R is revenue from revenue source i. 
 In order to calculate the overall growth rate (G), the growth rate for the ith 
revenue source (G) is weighted by ―that is, the proportion of total revenue produced 
by the ith revenue source. When the revenue structure includes six revenue sources, the 
overall growth rate is measured by a weighted average of the growth rates of the 
individual revenue sources (White, 1983). 
 Revenue volatility. Two steps are used to calculate revenue volatility for a 
revenue portfolio. 
 Step 1: Unit standard deviation. Revenue volatility for an individual revenue 
source is measured by the unit standard deviation―that is, deviation from the predicted 
level of revenues (R ). It is calculated as follows (White, 1983): 
(3)    σ  !∑ "#$%#
 $#· '
()$*+
,-  
where σ is the standard deviation of the ith revenue source, 
R is the revenue from the ith revenue source in period t, 
R  is expected revenue from the ith revenue source in period t, obtained from Equation 2, 
R· is mean revenue of the ith revenue source for period 1 through m, and  
m is the number of time periods included in the analysis. 
 In order to calculate the unit standard deviation, it is necessary to estimate R . 
 Step 2: The revenue volatility for a revenue portfolio. To measure the volatility 
associated with a particular revenue portfolio, we need to calculate the variance of 
individual revenue source and the covariance (σ.) between revenue sources (White, 1983, 
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p. 106). The measure of covariance can be calculated as σ.  ρ.σσ. whereas the overall 
measure of volatility for a revenue portfolio at a point in time is expressed as follows 
(White, 1983, p. 106; Misiolek & Perdue, 1987, p. 111): 
(4)    σ/  ∑ ∑ RR.0.0 ρ.σσ. 
where σ, and  σ. are the standard deviations of revenue source ith and jth, respectively, 
ρ. is the correlation coefficient between the two revenue sources ith and jth when  4 5 
and the variance for the ith and jth revenue sources when i = j, and 
R and R. are the levels of each revenue source i and j, respectively, for the period under 
study.  
The revenue portfolio volatility is estimated in millions of squared dollars (Yan, 2008). 
 Independent variables. The main independent variables are economic condition 
and revenue diversification. 
 Economic condition. My research measures economic condition using annual per 
capita real gross domestic product (GDP) by state. According to the Bureau Economic 
Analysis, GDP by state is “the state counterpart of the Nation's gross domestic product 
(GDP), the Bureau's featured and comprehensive measure of U.S. economic activity.” 
(Bureau Economic Analysis, 2012).7 Economic conditions could be positively correlated 
with revenue growth and volatility.  
 Revenue diversification. In the public finance literature, revenue diversification is 
usually measured using Suyderhoud's modified HHI. Revenue diversification for state n 
at date t is measured as follows: 
                                                 
7
  Retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/gsp_newsrelease 
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(6)    RD0,  -∑ ,7,$(8*+9.;<<  
where R,0, is the share of total general fund state-own source revenues generated by 
source i for state n at date t. 
 My study calculates the index for every state and every year using six sources of 
total general fund state-own source revenues: individual income and corporate income 
taxes, general sales taxes, motor fuel taxes, property taxes, and charges and fees for 
services, and all other revenues. If all of the six revenue source shares are identical at 
0.1666, then the numerator will be .8333 and the index will equal 1. On the other hand, if 
revenue is generated by only one source, that source's fraction will equal 1, the numerator 
will equal 0, and thus, the index will equal 0. However, this does not mean that perfectly 
balanced revenue shares among the six sources are an optimal portfolio. Rather, this 
index can be a useful measure for comparing relative revenue diversity across states 
(Schunk & Porca, 2005). 
 Control variables. The model employs additional control variables to isolate the 
effects of revenue diversification from other factors influencing the dependent variables. 
Thus, this model controls for revenue capacity. First, to control the effect of a state's 
varying revenue capacity on its revenue growth and volatility, the log of per capita 
personal income of the state is used as a proxy for revenue capacity (Yan, 2008). As 
volatility and growth are sensitive to income change, income would have positive 
correlations with revenue volatility and growth respectively (Hendrick, 2002; Holcombe 
& Sobel, 1997). 
 Second, to control the effect of a state's size on its revenue growth and volatility, 
the log of annual state population is included in the model. The size of a jurisdiction has a 
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positive impact on revenue stability (Yan, 2008); thus, a negative relationship between a 
state's annual population and revenue volatility is expected. As there is no prior literature 
on the relationship between revenue growth and population, population could be 
negatively or positively correlated with revenue growth. 
 Finally, political factors, such as the annual state proportion of House seats held 
by the Democratic Party and Democratic governor might influence revenue growth and 
volatility, being particularly salient during the process of revenue adjustment in states 
facing unexpected deficits. If the leadership in the house is Democrats and/or the 
governor is a Democrat, the pro-spending proclivity of Democrats will lead to increases 
in revenues (Kioko & Martell, 2012). In my research, the political control factors are 
captured by a dichotomous variable, with Democratic House and Democratic governor 
being equal to one and zero otherwise. The expected sign of the variable is positive. 
Panel Data Set 
 The research uses a panel data set of 50 American states from 1980 to 2011. The 
data were gathered mainly from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census Bureau, and 
Council of State Governments. 
 This 32-year period includes four recessions. According to the National Bureau of 
Economics (2010), the first recession of this period began in July 1981 and ended in 
November 1982, the second recession began in July 1990 and ended in March 1991, the 
third recession started in March 2001 and ended in November 2001, and the fourth 
recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.8   
                                                 
8
  Retrieved from the National Bureau of Economic Research: 
http:/www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html  
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 Panel data―that is, the mixed data concerning inter-individual differences and 
intra-individual dynamics―have several advantages compared to either purely cross-
sectional or purely time-series data (Hsiao, 2005). First, panel data can include rich 
information concerning both time and cross-sectional aspects of a phenomenon. Second, 
a panel data analysis can reduce the omitted variable bias. Third, panel data have more 
degrees of freedom, more variability, and less multicollinearity among variables than 
purely time-series data. Fourth, panel data analysis helps us construct and test hypotheses 
that are more complicated such as when assuming the effect of the implementation of a 
tax policy, as compared to purely cross-sectional or time-series analyses. Fifth, the panel 
data enable a comparison of the states for variations because of fixed differences at one 
point in time. The data also enable us to evaluate states’ responses to temporal factors 
causing variations in their behavior. 
 There are several basic characteristics of panel data. Before going deeper, this 
section explains the characteristics of panel data, referring to the book by Cameron and 
Trivedi (2010) entitled Microeconometrics using stata. 
 First, panel data are generally collected at regular time intervals, as are most time 
series data. For example, panel data related to tax revenues can be collected annually or 
quarterly. 
 Second, a panel dataset can be balanced or unbalanced. In a balanced dataset, 
subjects in samples are observed during all time periods whereas in an unbalanced 
dataset, the subjects in the samples from one period are not observed the same as those 
from another (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Eom et al., 2008). In a balanced dataset for 
Table 5, each subject has the same number of observations (Frees, 2004). If, in Table 5, 
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the data on states' personal income in 2007 are omitted in the data collection process, it 
will create an unbalanced dataset as shown in Table 6. 
Table 5 
An Example of a Balanced Panel Dataset 
Observations Year Personal Income 
($ thousands) 
Total Sales & Gross 
Receipt Tax($ 
thousands) 
Population 
Alabama 2000 107,151 3,228,445 4,447 
... ... ... ... ... 
Alabama 2006 144,437 4,233,895 4,598 
Alabama 2007 152,136 4,390,386 4,638 
Alabama 2008 157,422 4,433,108 4,677 
Alaska 2000 19,158 137,735 627 
... ... ... ... ... 
Alaska 2006 26,307 208,898 677 
Alaska 2007 28,030 235,797 682 
Alaska 2008 30,224 279,569 688 
... ... ... ... ... 
Wyoming 2000 14,463 476,596 494 
... ... ... ... ... 
Wyoming 2006 22,912 747,610 513 
Wyoming 2007 24,457 825,964 523 
Wyoming 2008 25,892 825,964 533 
 
Note: U.S. Census of Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2000 to 2008. 
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Table 6 
An Example of an Unbalanced Panel Dataset 
Observations Year Personal Income 
($ thousands) 
Total Sales & 
Gross Receipt 
Tax($ thousands) 
Population 
Alabama 2000 107,151 3,228,445 4,447 
... ... ... ... ... 
Alabama 2006 144,437 4,233,895 4,598 
Alabama 2007 Omitted 4,390,386 4,638 
Alabama 2008 157,422 4,433,108 4,677 
Alaska 2000 19,158 137,735 627 
... ... ... ... ... 
Alaska 2006 26,307 208,898 677 
Alaska 2007 Omitted 235,797 682 
Alaska 2008 30,224 279,569 688 
... ... ... ... ... 
Wyoming 2000 14,463 476,596 494 
... ... ... ... ... 
Wyoming 2006 22,912 747,610 513 
Wyoming 2007 Omitted 825,964 523 
Wyoming 2008 25,892 825,964 533 
 
Note: U.S. Census of Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2000 to 2008 
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 An unbalanced panel dataset might lead to a biased estimation of results in 
practice, but panel data analysis has a statistical remedy―namely, including a fixed-
effects model for missing values (Eom et al., 2008). 
 Third, observations can be collected over several periods of time from many 
individuals (a short panel), over many time periods from a few individuals (a long panel), 
or both in several time periods and from many individuals (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
Typically, in a short panel, the number of time periods is fewer than 10 (Binder et al., 
2005). An example of a short panel is the panel dataset for the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) on the dynamic relationship between wages and hours worked for 898 
American males covering the years 1977 to 1981. A long panel tends to include 
approximately 20 to 50 years of data (Frees, 2004).  
 An example of a long panel is the dataset of the U.S. state-year panel from Baltagi, 
Griffin, and Xiong (2000) on annual cigarette consumption and price for 46 states from 
1963 to 1992. In Baltagi et al.'s (2000) study, if T = 30 is large relative to N = 46, it 
would be necessary to specify a panel data model for serial correlation in the error 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Moreover, if N is small, it is possible to relax the assumption 
that the error term is independent over subjects (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The different 
datasets result in different inferences and estimations of results (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010). 
 Fourth, in panel data models, model errors tend to be correlated. Correlations (or 
clustering) occur over time for a given individual with independence over individual units 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Frees, 2004). Correlations also exist across different 
individual units. The former refers to serial correlation whereas the latter refers to cross-
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sectional correlation9. For example, if the total tax revenues in 50 state governments are 
observed annually over time from 2000 to 2012, the error in tax revenues of the previous 
year for a given state such as Arizona, ε>?@A0B,-, is correlated with the error in tax 
revenue of the following year, ε>?@A0B,. This is serial correlation. In addition, the tax 
revenues of one state (e.g., Arizona) are correlated with those of other states; these 
correlations are cross-sectional correlations. Coefficients in the model with serial 
correlations are estimated using differencing data or unit-root tests. Coefficients in the 
model with cross-sectional correlations are estimated using feasible generalized least-
squares procedures (FGLS) 10 (Frees, 2004). 
                                                 
9
 “Cross-sectional correlations are particularly important in studies of governmental units, 
such as states or nations. In some fields, such as political science, when T is large relative to N, 
the data are referred to as time-series cross-section data. This nomenclature distinguishes this 
setup from the panel context, where N is large relative to T. For example, ... time-series cross-
section data would typically range from 10 to 100 subjects with each subject observed over a long 
period, perhaps 20 to 50 years; many cross-national studies have ratios of N to T that are close to 
1. Such studies involve economic, social, or political comparisons of countries or states; because 
of the linkages among governmental units, the interest is in models that permit substantial 
contemporaneous correlation.” (Frees, 2004, p. 286) 
 
10
  “Regardless of the assumptions made, some correction to default ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) standard errors is usually necessary and efficiency gains using generalized least squares 
(GLS) may be possible” (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 236).  
 “Generalized least-square estimation in a regression context has drawbacks that are well 
documented.  GLS estimators are more efficient than OLS estimators when the variance 
parameters are known. However, because variance parameters are rarely known, one must use 
instead feasible GLS estimators. Asymptotically, feasible GLS estimators may be more or less 
efficient than OLS estimators, depending on the regression design and distribution of 
disturbances. ... Having many variance parameters means that feasible GLS estimators are 
inefficient in regression designs that are typically of interest in political science 
application. ...Thus, ... using OLS estimators of regression coefficients [is recommended.]  To 
account for the cross-sectional correlations, ... using standard errors [is] robust to the presence of 
cross-sectional correlations, [known as] panel-corrected standard errors.” (Frees, 2004, p. 287) 
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 Fifth, regression variables have different characteristics depending on regressor 
type. Examples include time-constant-11 and time-varying variables. A time-constant 
variable is one that does not change over time whereas a time-varying variable is not 
constant in time. An example of a time-constant variable is gender in a study of the 
gender effects on a taxpayer's tax liability because gender can be assumed not to change 
for a taxpayer over time (Frees, 2004). Another example of a time-constant variable is a 
variable that classifies subjects into groups, such as a treatment group and a control group 
(Frees, 2004). By using a group variable, we are able to compare the treatment effects, 
such as new tax policy implementation within different groups: a treatment group and a 
control group (Frees, 2004). Meanwhile, an example of a time-varying variable is 
inflation, which varies over time (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). In general, inflation tends 
to move upward over a period of time, except during 2011 and 2012.   
 Finally, two distinct panel data models exist: the fixed- effects model and 
random- effects model. By observing subjects over time, we can find that subjects are not 
like one another; rather, they are heterogeneous (Frees, 2004). A panel data analysis 
incorporates subjects' uniqueness (or heterogeneity among subjects), denoted bya, into 
the model: y  a  xβ (Frees, 2004). Models with the heterogeneity term are referred 
to as heterogeneous models whereas models without such terms are referred to as 
homogeneous models (Frees, 2004).   
                                                 
11
  “We saw that time-constant variables are perfectly collinear with subject-specific 
intercepts and hence are inestimable. In contrast, coefficients associated with time-constant 
variables are estimable in a random-effects model. Hence, if a time-constant variable such as 
gender or treatment group is the primary variable of interest, one should design the longitudinal 
study so that a random-effects model can be used.” (Frees, 2004, p. 78) 
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 According to Frees (2004), heterogeneity might be interpreted as "observations 
from the same subject tend[ing] to be similar compared to observations from different 
subjects" (p. 8). Accordingly, heterogeneity can be modeled by "examining the sources of 
correlation among repeated observations from a subject" (p. 8). For many data sets, 
researchers expect to identify positive correlations among the observations when 
examining Ey,, y,/, F , y,G (Frees, 2004). One possible source is the dynamic pattern 
among repeated observations (Frees, 2004). The other possible source is that the 
dependent variable shares "a common, yet unobserved, subject-specific parameter" 
leading to a positive correlation" (Frees, 2004, p. 8). 
Research Design 1: Fixed effects model.  
 My dissertation basically employs the fixed effects model because it uses data on 
the population of the 50 states rather than the sample data drawn from the population of 
states. A fixed effects model has the ability to control for a possibly correlated, time-
constant variable without observation, denoted by a. The a is referred to as a fixed 
effect―a is fixed over time (Wooldridge, 2009). A model including a fixed effect is 
called an unobserved effects or a fixed effects model (Wooldridge, 2009). 
 Several panel data models exist. One of the criteria for distinguishing among 
these models is their way of treating heterogeneity. Examples of panel data models 
include the fixed effects model and random effects model.   
 The general regression model of panel data can be represented as follows (Eom et 
al., 2008, p. 579): 
y=β9  βx,  F  βHx,H  v, i  1, … , N; t  1, … , T; k  1, … , K. 
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where i is the unit of observation, t is the period of time, k indicates the kth explanatory 
variable, β9 is the intercept, βH is the coefficient of each explanatory variable, and v is 
the error term (Eom, et al., 2008, p. 579). 
 In general, a basic panel data model decomposes an error term v into two error 
components: an individual-specific error term a and an idiosyncratic error term u. The 
benefits of decomposing the error term v into a and u include the possibility of 
minimizing concerns of omitted variable bias. The individual-specific error term a is 
also known as the unobserved effect, unobserved heterogeneity, or the fixed effect (Eom 
et al., 2008). In the basic panel model, the idiosyncratic error term u is uncorrelated 
with regressors x (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
 The fixed effects and random effects models employ different assumptions in 
regard to the error term. A fixed-effects (FE) model assumes that a is correlated with the 
regressors x while x is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error u. The FE model 
removes the time-constant variable a, such as differencing panel data across time periods: 
consequently, we cannot estimate a. In contrast, the random-effects (RE) model assumes 
that the a is purely random and is uncorrelated with the regressors. Advantages of the 
random-effects model are that it provides estimates of all coefficients, even those of time-
constant regressors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). However, the model's major 
disadvantage is that these estimates are inconsistent in some cases, for which the FE 
model is more appropriate (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). A fixed effects model is widely 
viewed as a more convincing tool for estimating the explanatory variables, all other 
relevant factors being equal (Wooldridge, 2009). 
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 Based on previous research, my dissertation assumes that revenue portfolio 
growth and volatility are a function of the economic condition, its revenue diversification, 
and random fluctuations. The growth and volatility of a revenue flow might then be 
expressed as G  f E, RD, C, ε and V  f E, RD, C, u, where G 
represents the growth rate in state i at time t and V is the volatility rate of state i's 
revenue flow at time t. E represents a state i's economic variable and RD is the state i's 
revenue diversification at time t. C is a matrix of control variables in state i at time t. 
Variables ε and u represent random fluctuations. 
Endogeneity of Revenue Diversification 
 My study further assumes that electoral cycles and the presence of tax and 
revenue limits as well as strict tax and revenue limits on tax increases affect growth and 
volatility only indirectly through revenue diversification. These factors constrain states' 
decisions on budget activity in terms of whether state governments raise revenues or 
which revenue source they will use, rather than directly influence growth and volatility. 
 To date, no research has examined the direct impacts of electoral cycles and strict 
tax and revenue limits on revenue diversification. However, previous studies have 
reported that the presence of tax and revenue limitations would influence revenue 
diversification (Carroll, 2005). Carroll (2005) found that tax and revenue limitations for 
the tax policy would decrease the level of revenue diversification. 
 Potential instrumental variables. To solve the endogeneity problem of revenue 
diversification, this study uses potential instrumental variables: the presence of tax and 
expenditure limitations (TELs) as the measure of the presence of tax and revenue limits 
and strict legislative super-majorities or popular referenda on tax increases as the measure 
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of the strictness of tax and revenue limits as well as gubernatorial and legislative electoral 
cycles. These variables are expected to be correlated with revenue diversification (i.e., 
"instrument relevance") but uncorrelated with other unobserved variables affecting 
revenue growth and volatility (i.e., "instrument exogeneity") (Wooldridge, 2006). My 
research uses the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity to determine instrumental 
variables. The result is reported in Chapter 6. Detailed explanations regarding how to 
measure the electoral cycle and other political factors are provided in the following 
subsections.  
 Tax and revenue limitations. To control the tax and revenue limitation factor that 
limits a state's ability to collect revenues, the model includes two dichotomous variables 
of the presence of tax and revenue limitations and the strictness of tax and revenue 
limitation as proxies for regulation.12 
 First, this study distinguishes between states with and without TELs using a 
dichotomous variable. Second, this study distinguishes between states with and without 
legislative super-majorities or popular referenda to enact tax increases, regardless of any 
form of TELs or other tax and revenue limitations that states use, using a dichotomous 
variable. The weak tax limitation does not require legislative super-majorities or popular 
referenda to enact tax increases, but constrains annual tax increases to a fixed fraction of 
previous taxes or contemporaneous income growth. Meanwhile, the strict tax limitation 
                                                 
12
  The idea of using an ordinal variable for measuring both the presence and strictness of 
tax and revenue limits is a very good idea for the future research. However, here, the presence of 
tax and revenue limits is captured by the presence of TELs in a state while the strictness of tax 
and revenue limits is measured by the presence of requirement on legislative super-majorities or 
popular referenda on tax increases in a state's laws.  
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requires legislative super-majorities or popular referenda to enact tax increases (Poterba, 
1994). 
 As Carroll (2005) reported only a negative relationship between revenue 
diversification and the presence of tax and revenue limitations in states and there is no 
prior literature on the relationship between strict tax and revenue limitations and revenue 
diversification, the correlations should be explored. 
 Electoral cycle. Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) considered only 2-year 
legislative terms and 4-year gubernatorial terms; however, my study includes all states 
with 2- and 4-year legislative terms as well as 2- and 4-year gubernatorial terms. In other 
words, my research tries to capture all years of legislators' terms (legislators' election year 
and first, second, and third years of their terms). The legislative term is measured by two 
dichotomous variables, coded as a 1 if a state is in the legislative election and 0 otherwise; 
a 1 if a state is in the first year of legislative term and 0 otherwise; a 1 if a state is in the 
second year of legislative term and 0 otherwise; a 1 if a state is in the third year of 
legislative term and 0 otherwise. For example, if a state is in the election year, the coding 
is (1, 0, 0, 0) whereas if a state is in the first year of term, the coding is (0, 1, 0, 0). Thus, 
there is no problem of perfect collinearity.  
 The governor's term is also measured by two dichotomy variables, coded as a 1 if 
a state is in the gubernatorial election and 0 otherwise; a 1 if a state is in the first year of 
governor's term and 0 otherwise; a 1 if a state is in the second year of governor's term and 
0; a 1 if a state is in the third year of governor's term and 0. For example, if a state is in 
the election year, the coding is (1, 0, 0, 0); if a state is in the first year of the governor's 
term, the coding is (0, 1, 0, 0). Thus, there is no problem of perfect collinearity. As there 
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is no prior literature on the relationship between electoral cycles and revenue 
diversification, the correlations should be explored.  
Research Design 2: Two-stage least-squares model 
 If all proposed instruments are valid (i.e., instruments are uncorrelated with errors 
in the dependent variable), the coefficients of the endogenous variable of revenue 
diversification can be estimated using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The 
first stage begins with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that includes the 
endogenous variable (revenue diversification) and the set of potential instrumental 
variables―governor's and legislators' electoral cycles and the presence of TELs and strict 
legislative supermajorities or popular referenda to enact tax increases―along with other 
exogenous variables including economic variables and other control variables―namely, 
income, population, and Democratic governor, and a Democratic House. That is: 
(7)   RD   δ  φ  γGEC  γ/LEC  γ<PTL  γ[STL  γ]E 
 γC  v 
where δis a state dummy variable; φ is a time dummy variable; GEC is two dummy 
variables for governor's electoral cycle in state i at time t; LEC is two dummy variables 
for legislator's electoral cycle in state i at time t; PTL is a dummy variable for the 
presence of TELs in state i at time t; STL is a dummy variable for strict legislative 
supermajorities or popular referenda to enact tax increases variable in state i at time t; E 
economic variable in a state i at time t; C is a matrix of other control variables; and v is 
a classical disturbance term. 
 The second stage of 2SLS is to regress a growth rate, G, or degree of volatility, 
V, on a economic condition, E,and revenue diversification, RD, along with other 
  58 
exogenous control variables―namely, income, population, Democratic governor and 
Democratic House. The predicted value of revenue diversification from the first-stage is 
used in the second stage of 2SLS. The state- and time-fixed effects are also included—α 
and s in Equation 8 and θ and n in Equation 9.  
 The following empirical fixed-effect models are used: 
 (8)   G   α  s  βE  β/RD  β<C  ε 
 (9)   V   θ  n  βE  β/RD  β<C  u 
where αand θ are state dummy variables; s and n are time dummy variables; E is the 
economic variable in a state i at time t; RD is the revenue diversification variable in a 
state i at time t; C is a matrix of control variables thought to affect growth and volatility in 
a state i at time t; and ε and u are classical disturbance terms.  
 Table 7 provides the summarized description of variables and data sources.   
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Table 7  
Variable Information for Revenue Growth and Stability Estimation  
Variable Description Data Source 
Dependent Variables    
Growth Revenue growth measured by portfolio trend growth 
line in % 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Volatility Revenue volatility measured by portfolio variance in 
millions squared dollars 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Independent Variables   
Economic Condition 
(Exogenous variable)  
Economic condition, measured by per capita real gross 
domestic product (GDP) by state 
 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Revenue Diversification 
(Endogenous Variable) 
Revenue diversification, measured by Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) modified to include six revenue 
categories; calculated as one minus the sum of the 
proportions of total revenue generated by each category 
squared and then divided by 0.833; transposed to a scale 
from 0 to 1, with increasing values indicating greater 
diversification 
Census of Governments: 
Government Finances  
Potential Instrumental 
Variables 
  
Electoral Cycle 
 
 
 
 
Electoral cycle, measured by dichotomous variables; 
coded as 1 if a state is in a gubernatorial election year 
and 0 otherwise; 1 if a state is in the first year of a 
governor's term and 0 otherwise; 1 if a state is in the 
second year of a governor's term and 0 otherwise; 1 if a 
state is in the third year of a governor's term; and 0 
otherwise; 1 if a state is in a legislative election year and 
0 otherwise; 1 if a state is in the first year of a 
legislator's term and 0 otherwise; 1 if a state is in the 
second year of a legislator's term and 0 otherwise; and 1 
if a state is in the third year of a legislator's term and 0 
otherwise. 
 
The Book of States 
published by The 
Council of State 
Governments 
Presence of Tax Limitation A dichotomous variable indicating whether a state has a 
TELs measure, coded as 1 if the state has TELs and 0 
otherwise.  
National Conference of 
State Legislatures 
(NCSL) 
Kioko (2011) 
Strict Tax and Revenue 
Limits 
A dichotomous variable indicating whether a state has a 
strict tax and revenue limitation measure; coded as 1 if 
the state has a strict limitation that require legislative 
super-majorities or popular referendum to enact tax 
increases, and 0 otherwise.  
National Conference of 
State Legislatures 
(NCSL) 
Kioko (2011) 
Control Variables   
Income Log of per capita real personal income Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Population Log of annual state population  Census of Governments: 
Population Estimates 
Democratic House Annual state proportion of House seats held by the 
Democratic party 
The Book of States, The 
Council of State 
Governments 
Democratic Governor Dichotomous variable indicating the political party of 
the state governor; coded as 1 if the governor is a 
Democrat and 0 otherwise.  
The Book of States, The 
Council of State 
Governments 
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Chapter 6 
FINDINGS 
 This chapter presents the descriptive statistics and regression results related to 
relationships among revenue diversification, revenue portfolio growth and volatility, and 
other explanatory factors. 
 Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the 
analyses. According to Table 8, the mean score for the level of state revenue 
diversification is 0.858, indicating that the states have fairly diversified revenue 
structures during the research period. 
 The mean score for the level of growth is 0.899 % with a 0.411 standard deviation. 
On average, growth rates are less than 1% over the years across states. The relatively 
small standard deviation of growth rates indicates that most states might have a similar 
growth rate. The mean score for the degree of volatility is 7.522 with a standard deviation 
of 20.104. With the relatively large standard deviation, state volatility differs widely. 
 Figures 3 and 4 describe levels of state revenue growth and volatility from 1980 
to 2011 as a scatter plot. According to Figures 3 and 4, a growth rate in most states ranges 
between 0% and 2 % and volatility degree in most states is between 0 and 50 million 
squared dollars in general. 13  
                                                 
13
  The revenue portfolio volatility is estimated by multiplying covariance between two 
revenue sources by each revenue sources' total amount. The calculation is explained in detail on 
page 41 in Chapter 4. As a result of the calculation, the volatility is estimated in millions of 
squared dollars. Revenue growth is measured by the trend-line slope of each revenue category 
and the average of all revenue's slopes and estimated in %.  
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Table 8  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Growth .8988159 .4118665 -.119091 3.59732 
Volatility 7.521622 20.10351 .0045029 257.8028 
Revenue Diversification .8582169 .097569 .206 .959 
Political Variables     
   Legislative election .47875 .4997044 0 1 
   First year of legislator's term .48 .499756 0 1 
   Second year of legislator's term .0212633 .1443059 0 1 
   Third year of legislator's term .020625 .1421698 0 1 
   Gubernatorial election .266875 .4424648 0 1 
   First year of governor's term .2625 .4401305 0 1 
   Second year of governor's term .238125 .4260692 0 1 
   Third year of governor's term .23625 .4249103 0 1 
   Democratic House   .55511 .1705482 .1285714 .9619048 
   Democratic Governor .5137117 .4972517 0 1 
Institutional Variables      
   Presence of TELs .443125 .49691 0 1 
   Strict tax & revenue     
    Limits 
.22 .4143758 0 1 
Financial Capacity     
   Log of per capita personal 
income 
Economic Variable 
4.524909 .0875431 4.269258 4.782471 
   Log of per capita GSP 4.590139 .0851768 4.400721 4.973684 
Demographic Variable     
   Log of population  6.516097 .4398049 5.604065 7.576156 
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Figure 3. Levels of state revenue growth, 1980–2011. 
Note: The line of fitted values presents the estimated linear trend line.   
 
Figure 4. Levels of state revenue volatility, 1980–2011. 
Note: The line of fitted values presents the estimated linear trend line. 
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Estimating the Relationship between Growth and Volatility 
 Table 9 provides the correlation estimates for the relationship between state 
revenue growth and volatility. As seen in Table 9, long-term growth and short-term 
volatility are positively correlated across the states. The positive sign of the correlation 
estimate might suggest that a trade-off exists between growth and stability in state 
revenues. Thus, if a state wishes to lower the volatility of its revenues, it must also suffer 
decreased long-term growth potential (Holcombe & Sobel, 1997).  
 However, the magnitude of the correlation estimate is not large, being close to 
zero. Thus, the weak trade-off leaves open the question of why political leaders cannot 
manage such a minor trade-off.  
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Table 9 
Correlation Estimates on Growth and Volatility 
Measures Growth Volatility 
Growth —  
Volatility .1490*** — 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at: ***p < .01. 
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Estimating the Effect of Revenue Diversification on Growth and Volatility  
 This section presents the statistical results describing the relationships among 
revenue diversification, growth, and volatility. However, before going on with the 
findings, I want to discuss an endogeneity problem I encountered. In the earlier stages of 
my research, the dependent variables were revenue growth and volatility while the 
independent variables were revenue diversification along with economic, political, and 
institutional variables that are expected to explain revenue diversification. In addition, 
during the literature review, as I analyzed the data, I had doubts about the possibility of 
endogeneity in the revenue diversification variable and assumed that the potential 
variables might be political leaders' electoral cycles as political variables and the 
presences of TELs and strict legislative supermajorities or popular referenda on tax 
increases in a state.  
 To identify appropriate instrumental variables, I performed a simple regression, 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity and a Stock-Yogo test for weak instruments. 
These simple regression estimates for growth and volatility using potential instrumental 
variables as independent variables are shown in Appendices A and B.14 To reach a 
conclusion, the appropriate instrumental variables in the revenue growth model (Table 10) 
are contemporaneous and once-lagged governor's electoral cycle while those in the 
revenue volatility model (Table 12) are the strict legislative supermajorities or popular 
referenda on tax increases as well as, the interactions between governors' electoral cycle 
dummies and dummies of the strict legislative supermajorities or popular referenda on tax 
                                                 
14
  At the conference of Public Management Research Association held from June 20 to 22 
in Madison, WI, I was asked questions about whether instrumental variables are directly related 
to the dependent variables, growth and volatility. Thus, I provided the regression results in 
Appendices A and B.  
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increases. Therefore, I considered the effect of revenue diversification on revenue growth 
and volatility treated both endogenously and exogenously. This section describes these 
results. 
 Table 10 reports the regression estimates for revenue growth. Revenue 
diversification, treated exogenously, produced the estimates that appear in column 1 and 
the estimates, considering the endogeneity of revenue diversification, are reported in 
column 2. 
 According to the results in column 1, revenue diversification levels are positively 
related to revenue growth levels whereas, as column 2 shows, (predicted) revenue 
diversification levels are positively related to state revenue growth. The results in 
columns 1 and 2 confirm the existence of a positive relationship. The effect of revenue 
diversification in column 2 is associated with an increase in the growth rate by 
approximately 7.4 % on average.  
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Table 10 
 
Revenue Growth Model Regression Results in (%) 
 
Variable (1) Growth  
(Revenue 
Diversification Treated 
Exogenously) 
(2) Growth 
(Revenue 
Diversification Treated 
Endogenously) 
Revenue Diversification 0.687647** 
(0.283570) 
7.42491***  
(2.283994) 
Log Per capita Personal Income 0.408812  
(0.333547) 
1.886422  
(2.175593) 
Log Per capita GSP -0.277251  
(0.238823) 
-0.759113  
(1.44547) 
Democratic House 0.003893  
(0.031818) 
0.220658  
(0.256920) 
Democratic Governor -0.001926  
(0.003050) 
-0.016187  
(0.042240) 
Log of Population 0.005695 
(0.055461) 
0.367088  
(0.449534) 
Constant  -1.135943  
(0.889405) 
-13.72593**  
(5.99709) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity (p-value) 
 2.97923 (0.0605) 
P-value: Joint significance  < 0.001 < 0.001 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test  
(p-value) 
 11.134, 10% IV bias 
10.22 
R-squared .9634 .5411 
Endogenous variables  Revenue diversification, 
Once-lagged revenue 
diversification 
Instrumental variables  Governor's electoral 
cycle, and once-lagged 
governor's electoral 
cycle  
 
Notes: Coefficients significant at: *** p < .01, ** p <.05, * p <.10. The lagged dependent 
variable is used in column 1. Cluster-corrected standard errors are included in 
parentheses. All specifications include state and time fixed effects. F-statistics have been 
adjusted for 48 clusters in state.  
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 Table 11 reports the estimates of revenue volatility without instruments in column 
1 and estimates with instrumental variables in column 2.15 
 According to the results in column 1, revenue diversification levels are negatively 
related to revenue volatility. In contrast, the level of (predicted) revenue diversification in 
column 2 is positively related to volatility. In other words, (predicted) revenue 
diversification in column 2 is associated with an increase in volatility. Nonetheless, the 
revenue diversification coefficient is not statistically significant and is approximately four 
times larger than the panel corrected standard errors regression estimate in column 1 in 
Table 11. The standard error also increases vis-à-vis column 2, implying that the 
asymptotic standard errors reported in column 2 are exaggeratedly low (Levitt, 1997). 
The imprecise estimates would preclude any strong conclusion (Levitt, 1997). 
  
                                                 
15
  To compare the results of 2SLS with the results without endogeneity, a panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) regression model is used in column1. The revenue diversification estimate 
is not statistically significant in the fixed effect model with lagged dependent variable and cluster-
corrected errors clustered by states. 
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Table 11  
 
Revenue Volatility Model Regression Results (in million squared dollars)  
 
Variable (1) Volatility  
(Revenue 
Diversification Treated 
Exogenously) 
(2) Volatility 
(Revenue Diversification 
Treated Endogenously) 
Revenue Diversification -49.84083*** 
(8.34263) 
182.5272  
(249.8051) 
Log Per capita Personal Income 3.719959 
(11.19298) 
-25.8805  
(41.18139) 
Log Per capita GSP 9.307082  
(8.036236) 
42.32214  
(44.65696) 
Democratic House 0.052129  
(2.137529) 
4.48087 
(10.62658) 
Democratic Governor 0.167028  
(0.334161) 
0.364579  
(1.21367) 
Log of Population 7.500533 
(6.05595) 
9.126113 
(14.76829) 
Constant  -60.80118  
(69.1347) 
-306.2611  
(432.2523) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity (p-value) 
 3.31 (.0693) 
P-value: Joint significance  < 0.001 < 0.001 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test  
(p-value) 
 20.031, 5% IV bias  
18.37 
R-squared .5829 .7779 
Endogenous variables  Revenue diversification 
&  
Instrumental variables   Strictness of tax limits, 
Governor's electoral 
cycles*Strictness of tax 
limits 
 
Notes: Coefficients significant at: *** p < .01, ** p <.05, * p <.10. Panel corrected 
standard errors in column 1 and cluster-corrected standard errors are included in 
parentheses in column 2. All specifications include state and time fixed effects. F- 
statistics have been adjusted for 48 clusters in state in column 2.   
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 In sum, when it comes to the relationship between revenue diversification and 
state revenue growth, there are similar results regardless of whether or not the 
endogeneity of revenue diversification is considered. In contrast, the relationship between 
revenue diversification and state revenue volatility is different depending on the 
consideration of revenue diversification endogeneity. I concluded that revenue 
diversification predicted by the instrumental variables will be associated with an increase 
in volatility. These results led to a subsequent question: What might influence efforts to 
diversify revenue portfolios? The next section will report the findings that answer this 
question.   
Determinants of Revenue Diversification 
 This section goes into detail regarding determinants of revenue diversification. 
The statistical results present which and to what extent explanatory variables are 
associated with revenue diversification. 
 Table 12 presents regression estimates for revenue diversification.16 In Table 12, 
per capita real personal income, per capita real GSP, population, and the House seats held 
by Democrats within a state are the most influential factors in a state's level of revenue 
diversification on average. To show the relationships clearly, the level of revenue 
diversification is transformed into a percentage by multiplying the level by 100. Here, the 
estimates of economic, institutional, and political variables are described as follows. 
 Estimates of economic variable. My findings showed a negative relationship 
between per capita real GSP and levels of revenue diversification in Table 12. Given the 
assumption that an increase or decrease in per capita real GSP mirrors economic change, 
                                                 
16
  Table 14 reports the result estimates for revenue diversification using the fixed-effects 
model with a lagged dependent variable and cluster-robust standard errors clustered by states. 
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a decrease in per capita real GSP (i.e., economic downturn) leads states to rely on a more 
diversified revenue portfolio. However, the result was not statistically significant. 
Similarly, assuming that per capita real personal income reflects a state's fiscal capacity, 
per capita real personal income was negatively related to revenue diversification levels 
and the estimate was not statistically significant, as shown in Table 12.  
 Thus, I reexamined the sign of the coefficients for both correlations between per 
capita real GSP and revenue diversification levels and between per capital real personal 
income and diversification. Table 13 reports the correlation estimates for them. As seen 
in Table 13, both per capita GSP and per capita personal income are negatively correlated 
with revenue diversification levels. Although we do not know to what extent changes in 
diversification are predicted by changes in per capita GSP or per capita personal income, 
we can confirm that these economic and fiscal variables are related to revenue 
diversification in a negative linear sense.  
 In terms of the value of r-squared, the per capita real GSP accounts for 
approximately 33% of the total variation in revenue diversification. The other 67% of the 
total variation in revenue diversification remains unexplained. The political and 
institutional variables might explain the other 67%.  
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 Estimates of institutional variables. Here, three instrumental variables are 
applied: the presence of TELs, legislative super-majorities, and popular referenda (i.e., 
the letters I labeled strict tax and revenue limits). According to the findings, the presence 
of TELs is positively related to the level of revenue diversification. Strict tax and revenue 
limits within a state are associated with a .09% decrease in the level of state revenue 
diversification. However, the result estimate is not statistically significant; thus, it 
precludes the conclusion that the strict legislative super-majorities or popular referenda 
on tax increases will prompt states to find alternative revenue sources that are not 
restricted by the limits. 
 Estimates of political variables. In my research, four political variables are used. 
These variables are the House seats held by Democrats, a Democrat governor, legislators' 
electoral cycles, and governors' electoral cycles.   
 As seen in Table 12, there is a positive coefficient estimate for the House seats 
held by Democrats. The positive sign implies that the more House seats that are held by 
Democrats within a state, the more diversified the revenue portfolio will be. However, the 
estimate is not statistically significant.  
 Each point in state legislators' electoral cycles is associated with an increase in 
levels of revenue diversification. In contrast, each year in the gubernatorial electoral 
cycle within a state is associated with a decrease in levels of revenue diversification. 
These estimates do not support the argument that the change in levels of revenue 
diversification would show a different pattern in the year before and the year after 
political leaders are elected (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, the estimates indicate that 
legislators' and governor's preferences for revenue diversification would be different. 
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Table 12  
 
Revenue Diversification Model Regression Results (in %)  
 
 Coefficient Robust 
Standard Error  
t P > |t| 
Legislative election 0.33822 0.210478 1.61 0.115 
First year of legislator's 
term  
0.362968* 0.189347 1.92 0.061 
Second year of legislator's 
term 
0.186340 0.237681 0.78 0.437 
Third year of legislator's 
term 
0.262305** 0.100509 2.61 0.012 
Gubernatorial election -0.344488** 0.141423 -2.44 0.019 
First year of governor's 
term  
-0.31348* 0.166713 -1.88 0.066 
Second year of governor's 
term 
-0.352092** 0.14706 -2.39 0.021 
Third year of governor's 
term 
-0.372611* 0.187374 -1.99 0.053 
Presence of TELs 0.135320 0.104198 1.30 0.200 
Strictness of Tax Limits -0.085229 0.16832 -0.51 0.615 
Log Per Capita Personal 
Income 
-3.172378 4.537805 -0.70 0.488 
Log Per Capita GSP -4.597507 3.04885 -1.51 0.138 
Democratic Governor 0.000550 0.11613 -1.48 0.138 
Democratic House 0.759131 0.130522 0.00 0.997 
Log of Population 2.285213 1.393671 1.64 0.108 
Constant  39.31052 24.40182 1.61 0.114 
rho = .54253007 
R-squared = .9336  
 
Note: Coefficients significant at: **p <.05, * p <.10. The lagged dependent variable is 
included in the fixed effect model. Cluster-corrected standard errors are included in 
parentheses. All specifications include state and time fixed effects. 
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Table 13 
 
Correlation Estimates among Revenue Diversification, Per Capita Real GSP, and Per 
Capita Real Personal Income 
 
Measure HHI Per capita GSP Per capita Personal 
Income 
HHI ―   
Per capita GSP -.5758*** ―  
Per capita Personal 
Income 
-.1889*** .6573*** ― 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at: *** p < .01.  
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Political Leaders' Preferences for Revenue Sources 
 In the previous section, I found that legislators' and governor's preferences for 
revenue diversification would be different. Given these results, I asked why. My initial 
expectation was that legislators and governors might adjust a state's revenue base and rate, 
acting out of different preferences, to enhance their reelection chances. Because of the 
inherent difficulties in measuring revenue bases, I examined political leaders' preference 
for revenue sources that compose a revenue portfolio as an alternative way. This section 
will report the findings that answer this question.  
 Table 14 summarizes descriptive statistics regarding each revenue source. General 
sales and income taxes account for 23% and 26% of total revenues, respectively. 
Selective sales taxes and charges and fees for services constitute 13% and 14% of total 
revenues, respectively.  
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Table 14 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
General sales tax .232 .112 0 .51 
Selective sales tax .129 .049 .01 .42 
       Motor fuel tax .052 .020 0 .12 
Property tax .016 .033 0 .27 
Income Taxes .258 .129 0 .53 
       Personal income tax .212 .122 0 .48 
       Corporate income tax .045 .028 0 .21 
Current charges .139 .048 .02 32 
Other revenues .304 .133 .12 .91 
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 Table 15 provides the coefficient estimates for the ratio of revenue source totals to 
total general fund revenues from state-own sources (in %) (i.e., total revenues) over 
governors' and legislators' electoral cycles. 17 
 Table 15 demonstrates that selective sales taxes that include motor fuel, alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco products, and public utilities, as a proportion of total revenues are 
negatively related to each point in the legislator's electoral cycles. Moreover, the share of 
income taxes, including personal and corporate income taxes, is associated with a 
decrease in any year of legislators' terms whereas the share is associated with an increase 
in all years of governors' terms. In addition, the share of general sales taxes, the 
proportion of corporate income taxes, and the ratio of charges are associated with an 
increase in each point of governors' terms. In other words, on average, selective sales and 
income taxes are roughly 0.72% and 0.61% lower, respectively, in all years of legislators' 
terms. Meanwhile, on average, general sales taxes, corporate income taxes, and charges 
are approximately 0.33%, 0.47%, and 0.33% higher, respectively, in any year of 
governors' terms. Thus, these estimates might indicate that political leaders have different 
preferences for each revenue source. 
  
                                                 
17
  I conducted the fixed-effects model with a lagged dependent variable and cluster-robust 
standard errors clustered by states. 
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Table 15 
  
Regression Estimates for Each Revenue Source as a Ratio of State Total Revenues (in %) 
over Governor's and Legislator's Terms 
 General 
sales  
Selective 
sales  
Motor 
fuel  
Property  Income  Personal 
income  
Corpor-
ate 
income  
Charge 
Legislative 
election year 
 
.072 
(.002) 
-.764*** 
(.002) 
.240 
(.002) 
-.047 
(.001) 
-.505 
(.003) 
-.387* 
(.002) 
-.005 
(.002) 
.007 
(.002) 
First year of 
legislator's 
term  
 
.157 
(.002) 
-.728*** 
(.002) 
.213 
(.002) 
-.007 
(.001) 
-.66*** 
(.002) 
-.356 
(.002) 
-.115 
(.002) 
.180 
(.002) 
Second year 
of legislator's 
term  
 
-.255 
(.002) 
-.863*** 
(.002) 
.161 
(.003) 
-.072 
(.001) 
-.73** 
(.003) 
-.70** 
(.003) 
.174 
(.002) 
-.094 
(.002) 
Third year of 
legislator's 
term  
 
.147 
(.002) 
-.543*** 
(.002) 
.19** 
(.001) 
.144* 
(.001) 
-.54*** 
(.002) 
-.61*** 
(.002) 
-.089 
(.001) 
-.179 
(.002) 
Gubernatorial 
election year 
 
.266 
(.002) 
.151 
(.001) 
.23** 
(.001) 
-.43** 
(.002) 
.211 
(.002) 
-.182 
(.002) 
.39*** 
(.001) 
.219 
(.003) 
First year of 
governor's 
term 
 
.315* 
(.002) 
-.166 
(.001) 
.119 
(.001) 
-.43** 
(.002) 
.109 
(.002) 
-.330* 
(.002) 
.49*** 
(.001) 
.406 
(.003) 
Second year 
of governor's 
term  
 
.388* 
(.002) 
-.065 
(.001) 
.158 
(.001) 
-.45** 
(.002) 
.066 
(.001) 
-.338** 
(.002) 
.43*** 
(.001) 
.424 
(.003) 
Third year of 
governor's 
term  
.356* 
(.002) 
-.073 
(.001) 
.107 
(.001) 
-.49** 
(.002) 
.112 
(.002) 
-.392* 
(.002) 
.57*** 
(.002) 
.277 
(.003) 
 
Note: State total revenues present a state's general fund revenue from state-won sources. 
Data source is the Bureau of Census. Coefficients significant at: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * 
p < .10. Cluster-corrected standard errors are included in parentheses. All specifications 
include state and time fixed effects. 
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 Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 roughly depict the changes in major revenue sources 
in a portfolio as a proportion of total revenues over years and across states. With the 
mean score of each source in Table 14 and the regression coefficient of each source in 
Table 15, changes in each source from its mean at each point of legislators' and 
governors' terms are shown in Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. I believe that a heavier 
reliance on general sales taxes in each year of a governors' term might lead to a less 
diversified portfolio. The lower reliance on income taxes including personal and 
corporate income taxes in each year of a legislators' term might result in a more 
diversified portfolio.  
  
  
 Figure 5. General sales tax changes over 
Note: LegElec stands for a legislative election year; FirstLT 
legislators' term; SecondLT stands for
stands for the third year of legislators' term; GubElec 
year; FirstGT stands for the first year of governors' term; SecondGT 
year of governors' term; and ThirdGT 
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 Furthermore, I reexamined and assessed the effect of revenue diversification on 
growth and volatility. I went through the same process to identify appropriate 
instrumental variables as I did before. Tables 16 and 17 summarize the statistical 
regression estimates for the relationships between revenue diversification and state 
revenue growth as well as between revenue diversification and state revenue volatility, 
respectively. Tables 16 and 17 describe the effect of revenue diversification on growth 
and volatility.  
 Table 16 reports the result estimates for growth without endogeneity of revenue 
diversification in column 1 and the estimate with endogeneity in column 2.18 19 
 Estimates for revenue diversification in both columns1 and 2 are positively 
related to state revenue growth. These results reconfirm the existence of a positive 
relationship again compared to the result from the revenue portfolio composed of six 
categories in Table 11. In particular, the effect of revenue diversification, predicted by 
instrumental variables within a state at its mean, is associated with an increase in the 
growth rate by approximately 4.25% on average. 
  
                                                 
18
  I used the fixed effects model with lagged dependent variable and cluster-corrected 
standard errors clustered by states in column 1.  
 
19
  Table 18 shows the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity and it leads to rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the variables of contemporaneous and once-lagged governor's electoral 
cycle are exogenous at the .01 level (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Thus, we can conclude that it is 
endogenous. 
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Table 16 
 
Revenue Growth Model Regression Results for the Base Portfolio (in %) 
 
Variable (1) Growth  
(Revenue 
Diversification Treated 
Exogenously) 
(2) Growth 
(Revenue 
Diversification Treated 
Endogenously) 
Revenue Diversification 0.76926** 
(0.332773) 
4.25249***  
(0.809305) 
Log Per capita Personal Income 0.312970  
(0.290140) 
0.564361  
(1.919205) 
Log Per capita GSP -0.294332 
(0.244490) 
-0.830396  
(1.37110) 
Democratic House 0.02046 
(0.027438) 
0.23106  
(0.233696) 
Democratic Governor -0.00093 
(0.003175) 
-0.009626 
(0.038609) 
Log of Population -0.041237 
(0.044428) 
0.325514 
(0.429519) 
Constant  -0.357556 
(0.728220) 
-5.00667  
(5.89494) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity (p-value) 
 15.31 (0.0001) 
Test of joint significance (p-value) Prob > F(31,47)= 
4616.11=0.0000 
Prob > F(8,47) = 26.92 
(0.0000) 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test  
(p-value) 
 7.851, 10% IV bias 
10.22 
R-squared .9460 .8600 
Endogenous variables  Revenue diversification, 
Once-lagged revenue 
diversification 
Instrumental variables  Governor's electoral 
cycle, and once-lagged 
governor's electoral 
cycle  
 
Notes: Coefficients significant at: *** p < .01, ** p <.05, * p <.10. Cluster-corrected 
standard errors are included in parentheses. All specifications include state and time fixed 
effects. F-statistics have been adjusted for 48 clusters in state.  
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 Table 17 reports the estimates of revenue diversification, treated exogenously, in 
column 1 and estimates with endogeneity in column 2. 
 According to the result estimates in column 1, revenue diversification has a 
negative relationship with revenue volatility. Interestingly, the results in column 2 
confirm the existence of a negative relationship. This result differs from the estimates 
from the relationship between volatility and predicted revenue diversification in the 
revenue portfolio composed of the six revenue categories shown in Table 12.20  
 The results in Table 17 imply that the decision about the number of revenue 
categories composing a revenue portfolio can generate a different story about the effect 
of revenue diversification on growth and volatility. 
  
                                                 
20
  To compare the results of 2SLS with the results without endogeneity, a panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) regression model was applied in column 1. The revenue diversification 
estimate was not statistically significant in the fixed effect model, with a lagged dependent 
variable and cluster-corrected errors clustered by states. 
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Table 17  
Revenue Volatility Model Regression Results for the Base Portfolio (in million squared 
dollars) 
Variable (1) Volatility  
(Revenue 
Diversification Treated 
Exogenously) 
(2) Volatility 
(Revenue Diversification 
Treated Endogenously) 
Revenue Diversification -34.12837*** 
(5.334556) 
-6.303148 
(46.85796) 
Log Per capita Personal Income 15.19639 
(12.74749) 
-27.14907 
(32.39353) 
Log Per capita GSP 10.96484  
(9.080117) 
19.48202 
(25.22613) 
Democratic House 1.104983  
(2.569568) 
5.639841 
(12.18164) 
Democratic Governor 0.390869  
(0.391314) 
-0.1476266 
(0.985351) 
Log of Population 33.52185*** 
(9.854465) 
26.9725 
(19.31165) 
Constant  -308.286***  
(85.59572) 
-134.5527 
(125.0901) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity (p-value) 
 3.95 
(0.0471) 
Test of joint significance (p-value) <0.001 F(5,47) = 18.32 (0.000) 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test  
(p-value) 
 18.32, 10% IV bias 
10.83 
R-squared .5966 .9036 
Endogenous variables  Revenue diversification   
Instrumental variables   Strictness of tax limits, 
Governor's electoral 
cycles*Strictness of tax 
limits 
 
Notes: Coefficients significant at: *** p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .10. Panel corrected 
standard errors in column 1 and cluster-corrected standard errors are included in 
parentheses in column 2. All specifications include state and time fixed effects. F-
statistics have been adjusted for 48 clusters in state in column 2.   
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 Furthermore, Appendix C reports levels of revenue diversification by state in 
2010 using a modified Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI).21 The first column uses the 
portfolio composed of five resources, including general sales, property, motor fuel, 
corporate and individual income taxes, and others. The second column uses the portfolio 
composed of six resources by adding a category of charges and fees for services to the 
portfolio in column 1. The third column uses the portfolio composed of 10 resources by 
adding four more categories (i.e., alcoholic beverage, tobacco products, public utilities, 
and motor vehicle license taxes) to the portfolio in column 2. The classification of 
revenue sources is adopted from the Census Bureau. Because of data availability, 
Appendix C reports the level of revenue diversification in 2010. 
 The mean score of the portfolio in column 1 is 0.7679 while the mean scores in 
column 2 and 3 are similar, 0.86838 and 0.861252, respectively. The standard deviation 
of the portfolio in column 1 is 0.121405 whereas standard deviations in column 2 and 3 
are also similar, 0.091732 and 0.080325, respectively. 
 In sum, this chapter reported the findings from the analysis of the collected data. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the implications of these findings. This finding chapter 
identified three problems that emerged. The first is endogeneity. Solving the problem led 
me to change my literature and research design. The second problem was the one of 
portfolio analysis versus specific revenue sources analysis. Judgment let me include both 
findings in this chapter. The third problem was the measurement of a portfolio. In other 
words, the problem was how many revenue sources should be included in a portfolio. 
This was the biggest problem I encountered and will require additional research. 
                                                 
21
  The formula is explained on page 51.  
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings and is done in the first 
section. The second section provides the policy implications of the research. Finally, this 
chapter discusses future directions this research can take.  
Summary, Findings, and Discussion 
 Based on the literature review, we know economic change affects a state's 
revenue portfolio growth and volatility. In particular, economic contractions—decreases 
in state per capita real GDP and state per capita real personal income—are likely to 
decrease revenue growth and increase volatility in revenue collection. However, it is 
unclear what to do about this problem. The literature suggests that efforts to increase 
revenue growth increase volatility and vice versa. If true, political leaders end up trading 
off growth and stability.  
 Public budgeting and finance experts have suggested diversifying a state's 
revenue portfolio to deal with the tradeoff. Taking advice from modern portfolio theory, 
they argue that diversifying a revenue portfolio can increase revenue growth and reduce 
revenue volatility over time.  
 A continuing question is why state portfolios have such a range of diversification 
levels: from 0.21 to 0.96 (see Table 8) (levels vary from zero to one, with one 
representing a fully diversified portfolio). The mean score of revenue diversification 
among states is about 0.86. The literature has little to say about what factors seem 
conducive to revenue diversification or lead to such a wide range of levels.  
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 This research is an effort to answer the question of what factors correlate with 
revenue diversification. I used fixed-effects and two-stage least squares models.  
 My findings provide several insights. When it comes to the relationship between 
growth and volatility, the correlation coefficient is approximately 0.14. The positive sign 
indicates that there is a trade-off between revenue growth and stability. However, because 
the magnitude is relatively low, there might be room for reducing volatility without 
sacrificing revenue growth. Restructuring a state's revenue portfolio might be a solution 
for increasing growth and stability at the same time.  
In addition, economic, institutional, and political changes are related to revenue 
diversification in my findings. These associations are described in the following 
subsections. 
 Economic changes. Economic changes are negatively related to revenue 
diversification levels. I measured economic variables with the log of per capita real GDP 
by state and the log of per capita real personal income over the 50 states from 1980 to 
2011. In the fixed-effects model, per capita real GDP by state is negatively related to the 
level of revenue diversification. However, the relationship is not statistically significant. 
State per capita real personal income is also negatively related to diversification levels, 
and this relationship is not statistically significant either.  
 Looking at these relationships another way, I wondered why economic variables 
are not perfectly correlated with revenue diversification. One possible reason why they 
are not perfectly correlated might be that other explanatory variables account for the 
other proportion of the total variance in revenue diversification. My reading of the 
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previous literature revealed other variables, which I categorized as institutional and 
political variables.  
 Institutional changes. Two institutional factors came from the research 
conducted by Carroll (2005), who used the presence of tax and revenue limitations in her 
research. I measured the presence of tax and revenue limits using a dichotomous variable 
indicating the presence of TELs. Feeling that strength is important, I added additional 
dummy variables, legislative super-majorities required for tax increases and popular 
referenda on tax increases, to my research.  
 The presence of TELs is positively related to revenue diversification. The 
estimate differs from Carroll's estimation (2005). The different result might be due to the 
different measure of the presence of tax and revenue limits. However, as the estimate is 
not statistically significant, we still do not know the relationship between revenue 
diversification and the presence of TELs. 
 However, legislative supermajorities and popular referenda are negatively 
associated with revenue diversification. In any case, none of these relationships are 
statistically significant (Table 14). 
 Political changes. Common sense leaves no doubt that revenue diversification is 
a political issue. The literature leaves no doubt either. To investigate the politics more 
deeply, I relied on advice from research conducted by Mikesell (1978) and Nelson 
(2000), among others. They argued that political leaders adjust revenue rates and bases 
over their electoral cycle to enhance their re-election prospects.  
It was very clear to me that Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) based their 
research on public choice theory. According to public choice, elected political leaders as 
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rational individuals are assumed to act out of their own self-interest, which in this case is 
reelection. As the most important political factor, the electoral cycle seemed apt as a 
metaphor. Given the separation of powers and the nature of state electoral systems, the 
legislative electoral cycle had to be separated from the gubernatorial electoral cycle. This 
is the way that both Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) handled the variables.  
After repeated efforts, I found that looking at a year before and after election 
alone—Mikesell's approach and findings— is not enough to determine the impact of 
electoral cycles on revenue diversification. More precisely, I wondered when over their 
4-year terms the governors would propose change and legislators would create new 
revenues, abolish existing ones or change revenue rates and bases. Conceivably, these 
actions can take place in any year of legislators' or governors' terms. Therefore, I 
modeled an electoral cycle as any year of legislators’ and governors' terms and correlated 
them with changes in revenue diversification.  
 I found that legislative electoral cycles are positively related to revenue 
diversification. Although any year of a legislator's term is likely to be associated with an 
increase in revenue diversification levels, the election year and the first year of 
legislators' term had the strongest relationship, just as Mikesell (1978) found.  
 On the other hand, each of the four years of a gubernatorial was negatively 
associated with revenue diversification. Any year of a governor's term was associated 
with a decrease in revenue diversification. As far as the strength of these relationships, 
each year of a governor’s term had a similar magnitude of coefficients.  
 Revenue diversification occurs as a result of political leaders' specific actions on 
specific revenue sources―namely, creating a new one, abolishing an old one or changing 
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the rate or base of an existing one. Therefore, I investigated the relationship between 
legislators' and governors’ year of the term and changes in specific revenue sources. Any 
year of legislators' terms was negatively related to changes in the proportion of selective 
sales and income taxes in a state’s revenue portfolio. Meanwhile, any year of governors' 
terms was positively related to changes in general sales taxes, corporate income taxes, 
and charges and fees for services as a proportion of state portfolios. 
 To summarize the findings still further, economic changes predict changes in 
revenue diversification most strongly. There are still important relationships between 
revenue diversification and institutional factors as well as between revenue 
diversification and political factors. Although these estimates are not statistically 
significant, the presence of TELs is positively associated with revenue diversification. 
Requirements for a legislative super-majority or a popular referendum to raise taxes (i.e., 
the strict tax and revenue limits) are negatively related to diversification. As for political 
factors, any year of legislators' terms is positively associated with any change in 
diversification whereas any year of governors' term is negatively related to a change in 
diversification.   
Implications 
Intuitively, we expect economic changes to be negatively related to revenue 
diversification. Economic expansions tend to imbalance a state's revenue portfolio. For 
example, a portfolio that relies heavily on elastic sources would have faster revenue 
growth than the other sources, making the portfolio less diversified. In contrast, economic 
recessions are likely to balance a state's portfolio for the same reasons. My statistical 
findings confirmed this expectation.   
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 Intuitively again, we expect to find a positive relationship between tax and 
revenue limits and revenue diversification. The TELs affect the most unpopular income 
taxes or largest sales taxes, respectively, in most states. Limiting these large sources 
allows normal growth in other sources to balance the portfolio.  
The data analysis did not confirm this expectation. That is, as long as strict tax 
and revenue limits appear in a state, revenue diversification levels decline. However, the 
negative relationship should not lead to confusion. Tax and revenue limits might prompt 
states to find alternative revenue sources, thereby increasing diversification. 
 The likelihood that political leaders will act to change a revenue portfolio to 
increase their chances of reelection is assumed to vary from year to year in their electoral 
cycle, with most efforts being concentrated in the last year of a term (the year of the 
election). The first year of a term might also be a hotbed of revenue portfolio activity as 
political leaders follow through on election promises and mandates. The data supported 
this assumption. 
 The findings about political changes imply that legislators and governors have 
different preferences for revenue diversification. In detail, every year of legislators' terms 
is negatively related to selective sales and personal income taxes. That is, the proportion 
of the portfolios held by selective sales tax revenues is likely to fall in any year of a 
legislator's term. The same goes for personal income taxes.  
In contrast, every year of a governors' term is positively associated with general 
sales taxes, corporate income taxes and charges and fees for services. Thus, governors are 
likely to do what it takes to increase their revenue portfolios’ reliance on these revenue 
sources. 
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 Implications are difficult to draw from these political factor findings. Perhaps, 
these results can be linked with governors' and legislators' differing behaviors to enhance 
reelection prospects. Relevant previous studies point out that legislators represent 
narrower interests than do governors (Crain, 1999, p.678; Dometrius & Wright, 2010). 
Legislators focus on their districts or specific interest groups. Selective sales taxes, 
including taxes on alcoholic beverages and motor fuels, might―in many if not most 
states―have saliency for narrowly focused clientele groups' interests. Thus, an increase 
or decrease in the tax base’s breadth and tax rates are very sensitive issues to legislators.  
 On the other hand, governors might tend to be more interested in broader state 
issues such as balancing the budget. Previous studies have found that governors' 
constituency-driven preferences lead them to be responsible for these broader issues 
(Crain & Miller, 1990; Dometrius & Wright, 2010; Hansen, 1999; Niemi, Stanley, & 
Vogel, 1995; Partin, 1995). General sales taxes, very often the largest state revenue 
source―as well as charges and fees have been frequent solutions to the resource side of 
budget balancing problems of reversing shortfalls. Sales tax rate changes can produce 
what it takes to balance the state budget quickly; thus, sales taxes are productive in a 
budget balancing sense. Charge and fee changes can help balance the budget 
unobtrusively. 
Future Directions for Research 
 My dissertation brings up the question of revenue diversification measurement. I 
used a six-source portfolio to measure diversification. Although the number of revenue 
sources in the portfolio did not seem to matter in previous studies, I varied the number. I 
found that portfolios with and without the separate category of charges and fees for 
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services yielded different statistical results. Revenue diversification and institutional and 
electoral cycle variables had a positive relationship with volatility when the category of 
charges and fees is included in a portfolio. Revenue diversification predicted by 
institutional or electoral cycle variables produced the opposite result when the category of 
charges and fees is not separately categorized in a portfolio. This finding implies that 
many of the variables in this analysis are very sensitive to changes in the number and 
type of categories used in the portfolio to measure diversification.  
 Second, the last recession revealed two characteristic ways to deal with revenue 
shortfalls. Some states increased their income tax rates while others increased their sales 
tax rates. Both of these actions have a considerable impact on tax fairness. It will be 
interesting to delve into how and to what extent changes in a revenue portfolio influence 
revenue fairness. Fairness is also a critical criterion for a sound revenue system. Previous 
studies, as well as my research, have focused on growth and volatility—that is, many if 
not all of the facets of what we think of as revenue adequacy. If diversifying a revenue 
portfolio spreads out the revenue burden over income classes, revenue fairness will 
improve. Because a diversified revenue portfolio is expected to increase growth and 
decrease volatility, it can improve fairness while simulataenously more nearly achieving 
the goal of a sound revenue system. It would be interesting to determine whether these 
goals have ever been achieved in the U. S. states. 
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APPENDIX A 
OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR STATE REVENUE GROWTH (IN %) 
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 Coefficient p-value 
Legislative election -.0242256 (0.0370695) .514 
First year of legislator's term  -.0189991 (0.0344392) .581 
Second year of legislator's term -.0078843 (0.0515136) .878 
Third year of legislator's term -.0088056 (0.0264833) .740 
Gubernatorial election -.0593198 (0.0454056) .192 
First year of governor's term  -.0514375 (0.0484169) .288 
Second year of governor's term -.0498296 (0.0469588) .289 
Third year of governor's term -.0585376 (0.0473497) .217 
Presence of TELs -.0676462 (0.0166561) .000 
Strictness of tax and revenue 
Limits 
-.0275781 (0.0158674) .082 
Constant 1.042891 (0.0744537) .000 
Year indicators? Yes  
State fixed effects? Yes  
R-squared .8054  
 
Note: Robust standard errors are included in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX B 
OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR STATE REVENUE VOLATILITY (IN MILLION 
SQUARED DOLLARS) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Legislative election -0.997(1.50) .507 -1.006(1.22) .412 
First year of legislator's term  -0.807(1.40) .563 -0.812(.99) .411 
Second year of legislator's term -0.687(2.24) .760 -1.600(1.92) .404 
Third year of legislator's term -1.145(1.42) .421 -1.434(1.57) .362 
Gubernatorial election 0.426(0.79) .587 0.364(0.87) .674 
First year of governor's term  0.390(0.78) .619 0.173(0.92) .851 
Second year of governor's term 0.427(0.65) .511 0.440(0.90) .625 
Third year of governor's term 0.480(0.87) .580 0.450(1.01) .656 
Presence of TELs 0.599(1.47) .684 0.605(1.48) .682 
Strictness of tax and revenue limits -0.011(0.68) .987 0.240(3.94) .952 
Legislative election*Strictness of tax 
and revenue limits 
  -1.014(3.34) .826 
1st year of legislator's term*Strictness 
of tax and revenue limits 
  -0.760(3.46) .761 
2nd year of legislator's 
term*Strictness of tax and revenue 
limits 
  1.416(3.97) .721 
3rd year of legislator's 
term*Strictness of tax and revenue 
limits 
  0 omitted 
Gubernatorial election*Strictness of 
tax and revenue limits 
  0.674(1.95) .730 
1st year of governor's term*Strictness 
of tax and revenue limits  
  1.221(2.14) .568 
2nd year of governor's 
term*Strictness of tax and revenue 
limits 
  0.174(1.46) .905 
3rd year of governor's term*Strictness 
of tax and revenue limits 
  0.434(2.08) .835 
Year indicators? Yes  Yes  
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes  
R-squared .6401  .6403  
 
Note: Robust standard errors are included in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX C 
STATE REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION OUTLOOK USING DIFFERENT REVENUE 
PORTFOLIOS  
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State Year 2010 HHI with 
5 revenue categories 
Year 2010 HHI with 
6 revenue categories 
Year 2010 HHI with 
10 revenue categories 
Alabama .758 .92 .904112 
Alaska .224 .354 .39394 
Arizona .899 .939 .898842 
Arkansas .907 .959 .91029 
California .85 .863 .814721 
Colorado .801 .904 .878864 
Connecticut .829 .87 .852903 
Delaware .43 .712 .747845 
Florida .719 .834 .847085 
Georgia .856 .889 .83827 
Hawaii .818 .896 .869552 
Idaho .868 .916 .874786 
Illinois .816 .891 .919871 
Indiana .84 .912 .889461 
Iowa .815 .92 .894005 
Kansas .852 .916 .866607 
Kentucky .854 .943 .915112 
Louisiana .678 .863 .915518 
Maine .849 .919 .898132 
Maryland .856 .913 .891045 
Massachusetts .8 .859 .826876 
Michigan .857 .942 .912157 
Minnesota .869 .91 .903953 
Mississippi .836 .912 .886379 
Missouri .842 .916 .88318 
Montana .656 .82 .878372 
Nebraska .853 .919 .878522 
Nevada .711 .786 .893337 
New Hampshire .566 .819 .924493 
New Jersey .821 .889 .864363 
New Mexico .715 .872 .862188 
New York .77 .813 .81199 
North Carolina .852 .898 .86545 
North Dakota .61 .802 .822188 
Ohio .794 .92 .910954 
Oklahoma .737 .891 .892438 
Oregon .662 .802 .785755 
Pennsylvania .802 .912 .92127 
Rhode Island .772 .895 .908035 
South Carolina .769 .911 .868495 
South Dakota .666 .8 .840872 
Tennessee .77 .843 .827007 
  109 
(continued)    
Texas .638 .808 .871069 
Utah .792 .91 .86558 
Vermont .87 .946 .935796 
Virginia .777 .89 .851418 
Washington .769 .852 .836368 
West Virginia .772 .899 .903875 
Wisconsin .84 .913 .913 
Wyoming State .688 .737 .718593 
Mean  .7679 .86838 .861252 
SD 0.121405 0.091732 0.080325 
 
Note: Data is collected from the Census Bureau. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
